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I. INTRODUCTION 
This special issue of the Duke Environmental Law and Policy 
Forum on sustainable development and environmental justice could 
hardly have better timing, as commentators are calling increasingly 
upon the United States to make sustainable development the basis 
for a new generation of environmental law.1 This spring's National 
Town Meeting led by the President's Commission on Sustainable 
Development ("PCSD")2 may well mark the beginning of a major 
American campaign to tap sustainable development's exceptional po-
tential. 
In this article, I explore the nexus between sustainable develop-
ment and another "revolution" in environmental law: the prolifera-
tion of state and federal policies designed to combat the 
"brownfields" phenomenon (the existence of abandoned or underu-
tilized urban sites that sit idle in part due to concerns over environ-
mental contamination).3 Brownfields sites remain idle in part be-
1. See Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in Asia, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 48, on file with author) [hereinafter Boer, The Rise] 
(sustainable development can lead to the next "great revolution of environmental law"); John 
C. Dembach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance (forthcoming 
1999) [hereinafter Dembach, Sustainable Development]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental 
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of 
Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REV. 933, 992-95 (1997) [hereinafter Ruhl, Thinking of Envi-
ronmental Law] (proposing sustainable development as a policy principle for a revolutionized 
environmental law, and stating, "[s]ustainable development, •.. must be a deliberate practice in 
today's world-a guiding principle for all social decisions."). 
Other nations are creating environmental policies that incorporate sustainable develop-
ment principles. See, e.g., Ben Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: 
The Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy Into Action, 
31 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 307, 342-57 (1995) [hereinafter Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically 
Sustainable Development] (discussing strategies for implementing sustainable development in 
Australia). 
2. The PCSD has been the locus of considerable activity on implementing sustainable 
development in the U.S. See Jonathan Lash, Toward a Sustainable Future, 12 NAT. RE. 
SOURCES & ENV'T 83, 83-84 (1997) (PCSD's co-chair describes its establishment and activities). 
3. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary 
Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 890 n.20 [hereinafter Eisen, 
Brownfields of Dreams]. See also William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, 
and Institutional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 4 n.l (1997) 
[hereinafter Buzbee, Institutional Determinism] (setting forth a similar definition). Brownfields 
literature is expanding exponentially. In one noteworthy recent piece, Michael Allan Wolf dis-
cusses the "curious and potentially dangerous intersection" between brownfields laws and poli-
cies and federal enterprise zone policies. Michael Allan Wolf, Dangerous Crossing: State 
Brownfields Recycling and Federal Enterprise Zoning, 68 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 
1999) (manuscript at 1, on file with author). 
For a use of the term "revolution" with respect to brownfields, see Scott H. Reisch, Reap-
ing "Green" Harvests From "Brownfields": Avoiding Lender Liability At Contaminated Sites: 
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cause of the threat of liability for brownfields developers under 
CERCLA or its state analogues.4 The consequences of this threat in-
clude the migration of jobs and tax revenues to suburban 
"greenfields" locations.5 Thus, states and the federal government are 
developing and implementing policies designed to promote the rede-
velopment of brownfields sites, such as voluntary cleanup programs, 
prospective purchaser agreements, innovative funding arrangements, 
and so forth. 
Both foci of this special issue-sustainable development and en-
vironmental justice-are directly relevant to any discussion of brown-
fields. The link between brownfields and sustainability seems obvi-
ous. The Clinton Administration has recently incorporated major 
features of Vice President Al Gore's "livability agenda." In its recent 
high-profile announcement proposing increased devolution of envi-
ronmental funds to state and local governments, this set of initiatives 
aimed at promoting "smart ·growth" authorizes $9.5 billion for 
"Better America Bonds" designed for reclaiming brownfields (among 
other purposes).6 Reusing unproductive urban land instead of spoil-
ing "greenfields" land comports with the Brundtland Report's defini-
tion of sustainable development. In the words of the PCSD, which 
adopts the Brundtland formulation,7 "Brownfields reuse and redevel-
opment promotes urban revitalization and reduces the development 
pressures on greenfields."8 How brownfields laws and policies 
Part I, COLO. LAW., Jan. 26, 1997, at 3 (terming "the brownfields revolution" a "reaction to the 
harshness of [CERCLA]"). 
4. See, e.g., Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 899 n.71. 
5. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 890-98; see also Buzbee, Institu-
tional Determinism, supra note 3, at 1. 
6. See E. J. Dionne Jr., "Smart Growth" Politics, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1999, at A29; Ju-
dith Havemann, Gore Proposal Aims to Tame Urban Sprawl; $10 Billion in Bonds Would Help 
to Finance Communities Open Spaces, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1999, at A2 (The environmental 
initiative "is expected to be a major theme of [Gore's] campaign for the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination"). 
7. See Lash, supra note 2, at 84. See also William A; McDonough & Michael Allan Wolf, 
Allen Chair Symposium 1996: The Future of Environmental and Land-Use Regulation: Inter-
view: A Dialogue on Design, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1071, 1079-80 (1996) (describing the PCSD's 
process of defining sustainability). 
8. See President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New 
Consensus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the Future (last modi-
fied Dec. 14, 1998) <littp://www.whitehouse.gov/PCSD/publicationstrF _Reports/amer-
top.html> [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE AMERICA]; see also TIMOTHY BEATLEY & KRISTY 
MANNING, THE ECOLOGY OF PLACE: PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY, AND 
CoMMUNITY 53-54 (1997) (noting that "[i]n the sustainable community, greater attention is 
directed toward using those lands already committed to the urban fabric more efficiently," and 
describing brownfields initiatives, but terming them "controversial and [to] be considered with 
caution."). 
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evolved also seems important. Commentators agree that creating 
new domestic environmental laws and retooling existing ones is nec-
essary for sustai.riability.9 They also find that relying on state and lo-
cal actors is important.10 Surely there can be no better implementa-
tion of both principles than a set of laws that transforms CERCLA 
and its state analogues and creates innovative partnerships between 
the public and private sectors. 
Governmental and private sector pronouncements of a connec-
tion between brownfields and sustainability are not hard to find. The 
Environmental Protection Agency seemingly cannot describe any of 
its brownfields policies without pairing the phrases "sustainable" and 
"reuse of brownfields."11 The multi-agency "Brownfields National 
Partnership Action Agenda" contains a list of initiatives of federal 
agencies and departments designed to promote "sustainable reuse" 
9. In those nations where development of environmental law lags behind the U.S., Pro-
fessors Ben Boer and Nicholas Robinson see.implementing laws as an important first step for 
sustainable development. See generally Boer, The Rise, supra note 1 (discussing sustainability 
and the evolution of environmental laws in China, Vietnam and the Asia Pacific region); 
Nicholas A. Robinson, Comparative Environmental Law: Evaluating How Legal Systems Ad-
dress "Sustainable Development," 27 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997). 
On the need to revisit existing environmental laws to achieve sustainability in the U.S., 
see, for example, J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World Envi-
ronmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y F. 273, 288 n.46 (1998) [hereinafter Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance]. 
10. See McDonough & Wolf, supra note 7, at 1079-80 (comment of McDonough, an archi-
tect noted for his views on sustainability, that "to paraphrase Tip O'Neal, 'all sustainability is 
local.' "). See also Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of 
Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development 
Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 175, 203· 
204 (1996) (" [T]he participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a determining fac-
tor in fulfilling [Agenda 2l's] objectives.''); Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 
9, at 289 n.48 (citing the Brown article). 
11. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownftelds Mission (last modified 
Feb. 25, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/mission.htm> ("EPA's Brownfields Initiative 
will empower States, communities, and other stakeholders in economic development to work 
together in a timely manner to prevent, assess, safely cleanup and sustainably reuse brown-
fields"); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, New Revolving Loan Fund Pilots (last modi-
fied July 31, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/brownfld/newloan.htm> ("EPA's Brown-
fields Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund (BCRLF) pilot program is designed to enable eligible 
states, cities, towns, counties, U.S. territories, and tribes to capitalize revolving loan funds to 
safely clean up and sustainably reuse brownfields."); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
State, Local and Tribal Projects (last modified Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/epapages/ 
epahome/partners.htm> (stating inter alia that "this program encourages economic develop-
ment and cooperation to prevent, assess, safely cleanup, and sustainably reuse brownfields."). 
See also Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 286 n.36 (citing brownfields 
funding as an example of sustainable development policy). For an example of a state program 
attempting to link the two, see Robb H. Layman and Charles J. Northrup, Survey of Illinois 
Law: Environment, 22S. ILL. U. LJ. 879, 909 (1998). 
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of brownfields.12 The PCSD's initial report (Sustainable America) 
lists a recommendation and three "action items" to spur brownfields 
redevelopment.13 The influential American Society for Testing and 
Materials ("ASTM") has developed a draft "Standard Guide to the 
Process of Sustainable Brownfields Redevelopment."14 As for envi-
ronmental justice, Professor Richard Lazarus terms the EP A's 
brownfields policies "plainly the [EP A's] most visible effort" to re-
spond to activists' concems.15 
But which brownfields programs will really lead to sustainable 
cities? Perhaps all, perhaps none; no one can say for sure. Any ar-
gument that all brownfields redevelopment is inherently sustainable 
is unjustified. As I demonstrate in Part II, for example, a brownfields 
program that deemphasizes the role of public participation is not 
"sustainable development". Moreover, without a hard law of sus-
tainable development, we must be skeptical about any program's 
claim to sustainability. In this article, I develop a framework for 
thinking of brownfields policies as a cornerstone of our nascent sus-
tainable development law. My analysis begins in Part I with a short 
summary of brownfields law and policy, and a description of our cur-
rent understanding of "sustainable development." There is no hard 
and fast definition of the term, but it is increasingly more clear that a 
body of sustainable development "law" will take shape as the product 
of a host of decisions made now and in the near future. 
12 See Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda (last modified May 13, 1997) 
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/97aabref.htm#sustainable>. 
13. Policy Recommendation 9 of Chapter Four of Sustainable America suggests the fol-
lowing: "Revitalize brownfields-which are contaminated, abandoned, or underused land-by 
making them more attractive for redevelopment by providing regulatory flexibility, removing 
process barriers, and assessing greenfield development to reflect necessary infrastructure 
costs." President's Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New Consen-
sus for Prosperity, Opportunity, and a Healthy Environment for the Future, Strengthening 
Communities (last modified Dec. 14, 1998) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/PCSD/publications/ 
TF _Reports/amer-chap4.html> 
14. See John M. Scagnelli, Draft Guide Proposed on Sustainable Brownfields, NAT'L L.J., 
Mar. 16, 1998, at BS (discussing draft ASTM Standard E-50.03); Standards Setter Weighs in on 
Approach to Brownfields, THE BROWNFIELDS LETTER, Nov. 1998, at 5. 
In the brownfields arena, the ASTM established credibility with its 1994 standard E-1527-
94 (Standard Practice for Environmental Site Assessments: Phase I Environmental Site Assess-
ment Process), which was widely used to govern the initial phase of risk-based cleanups at 
brownfields sites. See id.; see also Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 931 n.208 
(discussing the widespread adoption of the ASTM Phase I standard). 
15. See Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVfL. L. 705, 716 (1997). 
Both the ASTM and the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council ("NEJAC") have 
made recommendations designed to respond to environmental justice concerns. See infra Part 
II. 
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The optimal way to ensure that brownfields programs mesh with 
this body of law-whatever it turns out to be-is to incorporate basic 
norms of sustainable development about which there is widespread 
agreement. Those agreed-upon norms are the f<;>llowing: brownfields 
programs should simultaneously consider social, economic and envi-
ronmental issues; they should substantively ensure a sustainable ur-
ban future; and last but certainly not least, they should strive for and 
achieve "equity." In Part II, I elaborate on these core concepts and 
suggest how they should be interpreted in the brownfields arena. I 
explain my preference for creating an expanded federal role in over-
seeing states' brownfields programs, adopting state schemes to en-
sure the long-run protectiveness of brownfields cleanups, and facili-
tating broad-based public participation in the brownfields reuse and 
remediation process. My central premise is that proposals which I 
and others have made to achieve these ends can be understood 
(though not explicitly designed as such) as attempts to comport with 
core principles of sustainable development. As such, I find an inde-
pendent justification for reforming brownfields programs to incorpo-
rate these principles. 
II. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND BROWNFIELDS POLICIES 
Brownfields sites include abandoned industrial facilities and va-
cant properties, and are concentrated in older industrial cities of the 
Northeast and Midwest.16 A plethora of state and federal initiatives 
aim to spur brownfields redevelopment; one could easily say that the 
enthusiasm for recycling brownfields has attained the status of a 
"movement. "11 Though the federal government has been active, the 
primary initiators of change have been the states.18 
16. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 890-95. See also Robert H. 
Abrams, Comment: Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y REV. 265, 277-80 (1997) (discussing the origins of the brownfields problem and types of 
brownfields sites); Buzbee, Institutional Determinism, supra note 3, at 1. 
17. See Madeline June Kass et al., Brownfields: Where The Market Makes Green, 13 NAT. 
REsOURCES & ENV'T 345, 345 (1998) ("The brownfields movement is replete with a diverse 
assemblage of private, governmental, and community stakeholders and an equally diverse set 
of challenges and opportunities."). 
18. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 915 n.153. See also Buzbee, Institu· 
tional Determinism, supra note 3, at 27-46 (describing "first mover" dynamics to explain how 
states took the lead in brownfields law and policy). 
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A. State Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Federal Initiatives 
Since 1988, almost forty states have developed voluntary cleanup 
programs ("VCPs") through statutory and regulatory reforms in-
tended to speed up the cleanup of brown.fields sites.19 No two states 
have identical programs and most differ widely in terms of the 
cleanup process and its requirements,20 but the VCP process, broadly 
speaking, is similar in most states.21 State programs are voluntary and 
usually commence with a developer's22 expression of intent to investi-
gate and remediate a brown.fields site in the state's program. Fol-
lowing an investigation to determine the level of contamination, the 
developer remediates the site to meet "generic"23 or site-specific 
cleanup standards, or concludes the process if remediation is not nec-
essary. 24 At the end of the process, the developer receives liability 
protection from the state25 but none from the federal government, ex-
19. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 13. 
20. See Standards Setter Weighs in on Approach to Brownfields, supra note 14, at 5 (citing 
consultant Michael Taylor's co=ent that "state laws vary considerably"). Since I last counted 
the formal voluntary cleanup programs, see Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 
app., several states have either amended or established programs. See, e.g., 2 BROWNFIELDS 
LAW AND PRACTICE (Michael Gerrard ed., 2 vols. 1998); BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd s. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis, 
eds. 1997) [hereinafter ABA BROWNFIELDS GUIDE] and STRUCTURING REAL EsTATE 
WORKOUTS: ALTERNATIVES To FORECLOSURE (1998 supp.) for descriptions of state pro-
grams. 
21. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 920 ("Despite widespread varia-
tions, there are some co=on features in each of the states' programs."). See also Buzbee, In-
stitutional Determinism, supra note 3, at 55 n.217. 
22. I use the term "developer" to refer generally to any participant in a state VCP, in-
cluding the current owner of the brownfields site. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra 
note 3, at 894 n.32. 
23. A "generic" cleanup standard is established on a statewide basis and allows a devel-
oper to remediate the site to a predetermined level, based on the type of contamination found 
at the site and the contaminated environmental medium. See, e.g., Eisen, Brownfields of 
Dreams, supra note 3, at 939-42. State statutes often require notice-and-co=ent rulemaking 
for decisions to establish these technical standards. See, e.g., Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 
3746.04(B)(l) (Anderson 1995) (directing the preparation of rules to establish cleanup stan-
dards). 
24. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 920. 
25. See id., supra note 3, at 950-65. Liability protections range from "no action letters" 
(letters promising that the state will refrain from enforcement actions) to certificates of satisfac-
tory completion of the process, releases and covenants not to sue. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 7, § 26C-3.3, app. A§ V(7) (1996) (developer may receive a "no further action statement"); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 343-E(6) (West 1996) (developer may receive a release from 
state liability); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A) (Anderson 1996) (covenant not to sue); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 25398.15(a) (West 1996) (certificate of completion for par-
ticipants in the Expedited Remedial Action Program). 
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cept in those states with whom the EPA has agreed to refrain from 
pursuing enforcement actions.26 This brief summary of the brown-
fields remediation process does not account for the many variations 
in individual states, some of which I discuss in Part II. 
On the federal level, there is considerable activity to promote 
brownfields redevelopment and reuse. The EP A's "Brownfields 
Economic Redevelopment Initiative" features a wide array of initia-
tives.27 These include (among others): (1) guidance designed to limit 
risks for property buyers through the use of prospective purchaser 
agreements;28 (2) pilot projects pursuing strategies to "test redevel-
opment models; (3) special efforts directed toward removing regula-
tory barriers without sacrificing protectiveness; and ( 4) facilitation of 
coordinated site assessment, environmental cleanup and redevelop-
ment efforts at the federal, state, and local levels."29 Another initia-
tive is "Brownfields Showcase Communities" which enables certain 
cities to serve as laboratories to "promote environmental protection, 
economic redevelopment and community revitalization through the 
assessment, cleanup and sustainable reuse of brownfields. "3° Con-
gress has created a targeted tax deduction for brownfields redevel-
opment31 and reduced the risk of liability under CERCLA for lenders 
that become involved with brownfields sites.32 It has also unsuccess-
26. At present, only 11 states have signed agreements with EPA Regional Offices that 
would preclude such enforcement actions. See infra note 108 and accompanying text 
(discussing these "Superfund Memoranda of Agreement"); see also Superfund Memoranda of 
Agreement (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
27. For discussions of federal brownfields initiatives, see Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, 
supra note 3, at 979-84 and Wolf, supra note 3, at 15-16. See also United States Environmental 
Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Brownfields Homepage 
(last modified March 12, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/index.html>. 
28. See Guidance on Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property 
and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995). 
29. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, Brownfields Pilots (last modified March 12, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov 
/swerosps/ bf/pilothtm>; Eisen Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3 at 980-82; Wolf, supra note 
3at15 (discussing the pilot projects which are funded at up to $200,000). 
30. Id. Sf!e also Wolf, supra note 3, at 16. 
31. The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 941(a), 111 Stat. 882, estab-
lished a tax deduction for certain "qualified environmental remediation expenditures" includ-
ing some expenses that would otherwise have to be amortized over several years. See generally 
Andrea Wortzel, Greening The Inner Cities: Can Federal Tax Incentives Solve The Brownfields 
Problem?, 29 URB. LAW. 309 (1997). 
32. The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 
1996, (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) creates an exemption from 
CERCLA liability for a lender that takes any of certain enumerated actions to protect its secu-
rity interest in a contaminated site. See also STRUCTURING REAL EsTATE WORKOUTS: 
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fully attempted to craft a brownfields bill as part of a comprehensive 
overhaul of CERCLA or as a stand-alone bill.33 
B. The Link to Sustainability 
Brownfields programs have achieved the '90s equivalent of legal 
permanence: prominent display on state and federal reguJators' Web 
sites.34 In this section, I consider how these programs --spould be 
measured against an understanding of "sustainable development" 
that has changed in roughly the same time span as brownfields pro-
grams have arisen. 
The widely cited Brundtland Report defines sustainable devel-
opment as meeting the needs of the present without adversely af-
fecting future generations.35 Obviously, this definition does not tell us 
ALTERNATIVES To FORECLOSURE (Supp. 1998) for a comprehensive discussion of the Act and 
cases arising after the Act's enactment. See generally Joseph M. Macchione, Comment, Lender 
Liability Under CERCLA in Light of the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit In-
surance Protection Act of I996: Does the Act Spell Lender Relief or Continued Heartburn?, 16 
TEMP. ENVrL. L. & TECH. J. 81 (1997). 
33. One commentator counts "twenty-five to thirty separate brownfields bills [introduced] 
in the past two sessions [of Congress]." Tara Burns Koch, Comment, Betting on Brownfields: 
Does Florida's Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into Opportunity?, 28 
STETSON L. REV. 171, 189 {1998). Recent CERCLA reauthorization bills have included pro-
posals designed to address brownfields redevelopment. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, su-
pra note 3, at 984-88 (criticizing brownfields proposals in H.R 2500, introduced in the 104th 
Congress); Susan R. Poulter, Cleanup and Restoration: Who Should Pay?, 18 J. LAND 
REsOURCES & ENVrL. L. 77, 94 (1998) (a "liability limitation [for brownfields developers] has 
been floated at least since 1994 in a Clinton administration Superfund reauthorization bill ... 
• "). These bills failed to be adopted for reasons described in an excellent article in this journal. 
See Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund Amendment and Re-
authorization: How is the Clinton Administration Handling Hazardous Waste?, 8 DUKE ENVrL. 
L. & POL'Y F. 245 {1998). See also James E. Satterfield, A Funny Thing Happened On The 
Way To The Revolution: The Environmental Record of the 104th Congress, 27 ENVrL. L. REP. 
{ENVrL. L. INST.) 10,019, 10,028-30 (Jan. 1997) (describing the failure of CERCLA reauthori-
zation proposals in the 104th Congress). 
34. For a typical state brownfields homepage, see Maryland's Voluntary Cleanup and 
Brownfields Incentive Program (visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http://www.mde.state.md.us/ 
environment/waslbrownfields.html>. 
35. See WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T AND DEV., OUR COMMON FuTuRE 87 (1987) 
[hereinafter OUR COMMON FuTuRE]. The Brundtland Report defines sustainable develop-
ment as follows: 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains 
within it two key concepts: {l) The concept of "needs," in particular the essential 
needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and (2) The 
idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environment's ability to meet present and future needs. 
Id. at 87. See also Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 17-18 (manuscript); A. 
Dan Tarlock, Symposium: Sustainable Development in Latin American Rainforests and the Role 
of Law: Article: Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a Shared Resource: 
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much about how to translate its normative statement into law. But in 
the past decade, sustainable development has evolved from this con-
cept into a detailed framework for requiring simultaneous considera-
tion of economic, social and environmental factors in decision-
making. Even though the argument over the concept and its defini-
tion still rages, a set of important core principles can be derived from 
the efforts to flesh out sustainable development's specifics. 
1. "Sustainable Development": More Than A Mere Concept ... 
The most comprehensive effort to refine the concept of sustain-
able development was the 1992 United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development (UNCED), which yielded two important 
documents: the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,36 
which contains twenty-seven principles designed to advance sustain-
able development, and the more comprehensive "Agenda 21"37 which 
contains a forty chapter framework of goals and objectives for sus-
tainable development. Included in the framework of Agenda 21 are 
specific actions nations should take to achieve a core goal of simulta-
neous consideration of social, economic, and environmental factors in 
decision-making.38 Additionally, the proposed IUCN Draft Interna-
tional Covenant on Environment and Development,39 if adopted as 
The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 37, 52 (1997) 
(stating that this is the "current working definition of sustainable development"). 
36. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/REV. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 
I.L.M. 874 (1992). 
37. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, AGENDA 
21, U.N. Doc. AICONF.1512/PdlOO/ADD.1 (1993) [hereinafter AGENDA21]. 
38. See Robert F. Blomquist, Virtual Borders? Some Legal-Geo-Philosophical Musings on 
Three Globally Significant Fragile Ecosystems Under United Nations' Agenda 21, 45 CLEV. ST. 
L. REv. 23, 24 (1997)("Agenda 21 was intended by its drafters to be 'a comprehensive action 
plan on sustainable development."); Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Develop-
ment, supra note l, at 313; Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 18-19, 27 
(manuscript) (arguing that Agenda 21's principles are the basis for an "ambitious intergenera-
tional social, economic, and environmental compact"); Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, 
supra note 9, at 291 n.54 ("The greatest contribution the United Nations has made to the proc-
ess of translating the international rhetoric into domestic policy is its Agenda 21 document ... 
. "); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52 n.86 and sources cited therein. Professor John Dembach has 
thoroughly analyzed Agenda 21 and recommended U.S. actions to implement it. See John C. 
Dembach et al., U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review, 27 
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,504 (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter Dembach, Agenda 21]. 
39. WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ENV'T AND 
DEV'T (1995) [hereinafter IUCN DRAFT COVENANT]; for the text of the covenant, see New 
Treaty In The Making (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.sovereignty.net/p/sd/covenant.htm>. 
Article 1 of the draft covenant states its explicit objective is to promote sustainable devel-
opment, claiming that it is necessary "to establish integrated obligations to achieve the envi-
ronmental conservation and sustainable development necessary for humans to enjoy a healthy 
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an international treaty, would elevate sustainable development from 
its current soft law status to an international requirement.40 
After all this activity, sustainable development still has not been 
universally accepted as a blueprint for action. Critics call it a 
"manipulative and confusing slogan,"41 a "myth,"42 a utopian re-
former's fantasy,43 a "meaningless post-hoc label used to justify the 
continuation of the status quo,"44 or even a buzzword concealing a 
threat to roll back existing environmental laws.45 Some see it as oxy-
moronic, arguing that if one accepts "development," or the now out 
of fashion "sustainable growth," one submits to ever-expanding con-
sumption of scarce resources.46 Thus, developing nations may see 
sustainable development as an imposition on them that allows devel-
oped nations' wasteful policies to continue.47 This relies on an out-
moded notion of sustainability as a concept pertaining only to the 
and productive life within nature." IUCN DRAFr COVENANT, at art. 1. See also Nicholas A. 
Robinson, IUCN's Proposed Covenant on Environment & Development, 13 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 133 (1995) (describing the origin of the draft covenant). 
40. The draft covenant, which has yet to be submitted for ratification by the U.N. General 
Assembly, would "convert the 'soft-law' recommendations of Agenda 21 into legally binding 
'hard' international law." New Treaty In The Making, supra note 39, at 1. 
41. See Joel B. Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism: Lessons from Federal Regulation of 
Urban Stormwater Runoff, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 1, 3 n.9 {1995) [hereinafter 
Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism] (quoting William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: 
Slogan or Solution, 21 B.C. ENVIL. AFF. L. REV. 483, 483 (1994)). 
42 See, e.g., Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Wasn't the Future Wonderful? Resources, Environment, 
and the Emerging Myth of Global Sustainable Development, 2 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & 
POL'Y 35, 36 (1991). 
43. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 3, at 48 (temiing the goal of sustainable development "lofty 
{perhaps utopian)"). 
44. See Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52 (noting that implementation of sustainable develop-
ment can· either advance its goals or amount to nothing). 
45. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 280 n.13 and sources cited 
therein. 
46. Earlier definitions of sustainable development, including the Brundtland formulation, 
tended to attract this criticism. See, e.g., Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable De-
velopment, supra note 1, at 317 (criticizing the Brundtland definition "because it invites narrow 
interpretations such as 'sustainable economic development,' without explicitly requiring con-
cern for or focus on the continued viability of ecosystems"); Susan L. Smith, Ecologically Sus-
tainable Development: Integrating Economics, Ecology, and Law, 31 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 261, 
277 {1995) (reaching a similar conclusion). · 
47. See, e.g., PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 200 (1993) ("Some leaders of 
· developing countries still fear that an international environmental compact would be a new 
strategy by the industrialized world to keep them in economic subjugation and to erode their 
hard-won sovereignty."); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52-53. Developing nations lodged the same 
criticism against the draft "Earth Charter" prepared as a follow-up to the Rio Declaration and 
Agenda 21. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Benchmark Draft of the Earth Charter: Interna-
tional Environmental Law at the Grassroots, 11 TuL. ENVTL. L. J. 109, 112 (1997). 
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maintenance of resource stocks48 which ignores both the normative 
force of simultaneous consideration of social, economic, and envi-
ronmental factors and the importance of the equity component.49 
The criticism would have more bite if we had termed it "sustainable 
environment" or "sustainable economy," as we "would have opened 
up a rehash of the old preservationism versus resourcism debate that 
paralyzed environmental law for decades."50 
Critics also deplore the vague definition of "sustainable devel-
opment." No one would doubt there is considerable confusion on 
this point.51 One scholar has discovered at least seventy different 
definitions, none of which offer much in the way of precision. 52 It 
does not help to say that Agenda 21's forty chapters "define" sustain-
able development; resolving the ambiguities in its hundreds of pages 
of specific proposals is "a bit like being told to follow through on the 
Bible. "53 However, the definitional imprecision may not matter in the 
end. Professor J. B. Ruhl argues forcefully that we should treat 
"sustainable development" as we do "democracy"54 by refusing to 
48. See, e.g., Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism, supra note 41, at 3-4. Of course, 
problems related to resource depletion, overconsumption of resources, and pollution are inte-
gral to discussions of sustainable development. See, e.g., Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically 
Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 316-17 (quoting JEREMY CAREW-REID ET AL, 
STRA1EGIES FOR NATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR THEIR 
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 17 {1994)). 
49. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 279-80. 
50. Id. at 279. 
51. See, e.g., Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 
317-318 {discussing the definitions advanced in The Future of Environmental Regulation: Our 
Common Future, Caring For The Earth, and by the Australian government); Gerald Torres, 
Environmental Justice: The Legal Meaning of a Social Movement, 15 J.L. & COM. 597, 618 
(1996) ("Sustainable development is a complicated area in which there is still considerable dis-
pute over the basic terms of the debate, including the definition of the concept of sustainability 
itself."). 
52 See generally Smith, supra note 46 (setting forth and discussing various definitions, and 
proposing a preferred defintion). For an American example, see UNI1ED STATES ENVI-
RONMENTAL PR01ECTION AGENCY, Region 10, Sustainable Communities Mission, Definitions 
for Sustainability (visited July 8, 1998) <WWW.epa.gov/rlOearth/offices/oi/definit.htm> (setting 
forth ten definitions, including those of the Brundtland Report and the PCSD). 
53. Daniel C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 103, 111 (1996). See also Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The Earth Summit: What Went 
Wrong at Rio?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1005, 1017 (1992) (stating that in 1992 "the legal and policy 
ambiguities raised by the issue of sustainable development were not adequately discussed, 
much less resolved"). 
54. Professor Ruhl argues, "[W]e do not demand detailed 'definitions' of democracy and 
justice in order to agree that they are useful concepts that should be expressed as international, 
national, provincial, and local goals for addressing those social problems." Ruhl, Thinking of 
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 995. 
Spring 1999] BROWNFIELDS POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES 199 
allow definitional vagueness to prevent translating a broadly under-
stood concept into hard law.ss 
2. . .. But Still Less Than Hard Law 
Despite the lingering criticism, sustainable development is an 
idea with staying power.s6 In a previous issue of this journal, Profes-
sor Ruhl sizes up the current status of sustainable development law in 
the U.S. He argues that any policy idea travels through seven 
"degrees of relevance" on its way toward becoming hard law; at the 
seventh degree, policy is enshrined in law.S7 In this taxonomy of 
transformation, sustainable development has at best reached the 
stage where "important governmental authorities establish the norm 
as an explicit policy goal."ss 
A recent book claims a comprehensive approach to sustainable 
development wo~d operate on three dimensions, featuring varying 
scales, with an "equal concern" for sustainability at local, regional, 
and national levels;59 multiple sectoral foci, with policies that address 
different sectors of the economy such as transportation and housing; 
and actions designed to take effect in different spheres of influence 
(e.g., public and private sectors).60 There is no such comprehensive 
approach to sustainable development in the U.S.. Professor John 
Dernbach concludes that Agenda 21 "has had little discernible effect 
on U.S. law and policy."61 The PCSD's reports, for example, have 
had little concrete impact on lawmakers.62 
55. See id. See also Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 276 ("[T]he 
relevance of an idea in the real-world sense can become entrenched, and the development of its 
law inevitable, well before there are clear technical measurements and a coherent body of law 
to apply."). 
56. See Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism, supra note 41, at 4. See also Dembach, 
Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 29; Nicholas A. Robinson, Attaining Systems for 
Sustainability through Environmental Law, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 86, 86 (1997) 
[hereinafter Robinson, Attaining Systems For Sustainability] (noting that despite the "'hype', 
there is substantial evidence of measurable progress toward the objective of 'sustainable devel-
opment"'); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 53 (noting that "despite its flaws, sustainable develop-
ment has displayed 'legs"'). 
57. See generally Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9. 
58. Id. at 284-87. 
59. BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8, at 23. 
60. See id. 
61. Dembach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10507-8. 
62 While the PCSD's reports have not yielded hard law, and few of their recommenda-
tions have been followed, they have had some impact at the federal level. See, e.g., Ruhl, The 
Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 286·87 (detailing PCSD's Sustainable America's 
impact on a variety of federal agencies). 
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No state or federal agency has anything resembling a sustain-
ability strategy.63 The general impression one gets of the atmosphere 
surrounding sustainable development efforts is of the energy and un-
certainty of ... the early years of personal computing.64 State and 
federal regulators use "sustainable" and "sustainable development" 
as if everyone understands what they mean, which is hardly the case. 
Surf any agency's Web site65 and observe that "sustainability" en-
compasses a wide-ranging assortment of new and existing programs: 
a notice of a $5,000 grant to a local urban forestry unit, a request for 
comments on a complicated energy deregulation package, or, per-
haps, a description of a state's brownfields program. The Web site of 
the EP A's Office of Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities 
(OSEC)66 lists programs and initiatives under the heading "Integrated 
Approaches," including case studies of community sustainability pro-
grams, projects on climate change issues, and efforts to develop sus-
tainable community indicators, to name just a few.67 While that is a 
commendable list of projects, there is no consistent effort to link sus-
tainability and the EPA's regulatory programs.68 
On occasion, a governmental program appears to be a more con-
scious effort to incorporate the substance of sustainable develop-
63. Some states have begun to develop statewide sustainability strategies. A Virginia 
General Assembly resolution of 1993 paved the way for the development of a Blueprint for 
Sustainable Development of Virginia, which "provides a state-wide vision for protecting the 
Commonwealth's resources." Sustainable Development Explored in Virginia (last modified Oct. 
29, 1998) <http://www.eli.org/archive/planstat.htm>. 
64. I am old enough to remember when the Atari personal computer was touted as the 
way of the future. See Chris LaMorte, Game Over, DENVER WESTWORD, Oct. 10, 1996 
(mourning the passing of "the last remaining exclusive Atari dealer in Colorado," and stating 
"[h]is beloved [computer] has joined the ranks of the eight-track and the Betamax"). 
65. The Internet is an important forum for discussions about sustainability. Besides offi-
cial regulatory pronouncements, there is considerable activity Online by individuals, non-profit 
groups and others sharing information and describing projects. For example, "E-Design On-
line" (an electronic online magazine) maintains Surfing Your Way to Sustainability, its list of 13 
"super sites" for sustainability information. Surfing Your Way to Sustainability (last modified 
Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.fcn.state.fl.us/fdi/e-design/online/9712/reviews/suswebl.htm>. 
· A comprehensive source of online information is the U.S. Department of Energy's 
Center of Excellence for Sustainable Development. Center of Excellence for Sustainable Devel-
opment (last modified May 9, 1997) <http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/>. 
66. The OSEC "mission is to foster the implementation of integrated, geographical ap-
proaches to _environmental protection with an emphasis on ecological integrity, economic sus-
tainability, and quality of life - otherwise known as Community-Based Environmental Protec-
tion (CBEP)." Sustainable Ecosystems and Communities (last modified May 9, 1997) 
<http://www.epa.gov/oppe/osec/osecbak/>. 
67. See id. 
68. For example, there is no discussion of brownfields law or policy; one needs to consult 
the EP A's brownfields page. See id. 
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ment.69 Some notable examples are the EPA's grant programs aiming 
to spur creation of innovative frameworks to guide urban develop-
ment. The EP A's "Sustainable Development Challenge Grant" pro-
gram funds projects "to promote long-term investment in sustainable 
development" in such areas as developing "regional governance 
processes for better management of urban development."70 The 
brownfields analogues are the EPA-funded pilot projects,71 some of 
which seem to have been designed with sustainability objectives in 
mind. For example, the Portland, Oregon project has set out to in-
volve a broad spectrum of community members in brownfields deci-
sions.72 
It is important, however, to differentiate between a governmen-
tal program that advances components of the sustainable develop-
ment agenda and one that reflects "a conscious effort to craft an inte-
grated sustainable development approach."73 The pilot projects, 
unfortunately, fall into the former category. Though many have 
yielded promising ways to conduct site assessments and remediation 
planning, the $200,000 funding ceiling ensures each project rarely 
does more than create a mechanism for governing remediation activi-
ties at a demonstration site.74 These and other EPA sustainability 
69. Professor Ruhl notes this trend with respect to certain recently enacted federal envi-
ronmental laws. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 288 n.46. 
70. The SDCG program objectives include "partnering among community members, busi-
ness and governmental entities to work cooperatively to develop flexible, locally-oriented ap-
proaches that link place-based environmental management and quality of life activities with 
sustainable development and revitalization." Financial and Technical Resources: 1998 SDCG 
Federal Register Notice - Solicitation of Proposals (last modified Nov. 9, 1998) 
<http://yosemite.epa.gov/osec/osechome.nsf/aWg-sdcg.html>. Brownfields-related projects are 
eligible for grants. See id. See also Matthew W. Ward et al., National Incentives for Smart 
Growth Communities, 13 NAT. REsOURCES & ENV'T325, 327 (1998). 
71. See also Ward et al., supra note 70, at 327 (discussing the Sustainable Development 
Challenge Grant program and the Brownfields Action Agenda pilot projects). 
72 See Portland Brownfields Initiative: Community Strategies to Recycle Land (last modi-
fied Nov. 23, 1998) <http://www.brownfield.org/>. See also Wolf, supra note 3 at 23 n.92 
(noting that recent solicitations for brownfields pilot proposals call inter alia for "applications 
that demonstrate the integration or linking of ... pilots with ... local sustainable development . 
. . programs"). 
73. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 288 n.46. 
74. See, e.g., Region 3 Brownsfields Pilots: Richmond, VA (last modified July 27, 1998) 
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/html-doc/richmond.htm> (describing the efforts of Richmond, 
Virginia, one of the first three pilot project cities, to "[d]evelopD a site specific property recy-
cling strategy in partnership with current/future site owners and users, government regulatory 
agencies, and the City's development staff''). · 
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programs are simply not comprehensive enough to amount to an or-
ganized effort to implement Agenda 21.75 
3. A Prudent, "Adaptive" Approach To Attaining 
Sustainability 
Without sustainable development "law," there are no adverse 
consequences to employing nominal means for bringing sustainability 
about, or even maintaining a certain fuzziness about the definition of 
sustainability. At the "fifth degree of relevance," the idea of sustain-
ability may have pervaded the collective governmental consciousness, 
but it is still just that-an idea. Consequently, there is still a wide 
range of perspectives on sustainability programs. To sympathetic 
commentators, they are embryonic formulations of strategies and 
goals. To critics, they are slapdash uses of the "sustainable" label or 
even cynical post hoc justifications of existing programs. 
Where do we go from here? Professor Ruhl's article provides 
milestones for assessing our progress toward the "hard law" stage, 
but he observes quite correctly that "it is far too early to predict the 
outcome in terms of the finished product .... "76 We are in a phase of 
"extreme nonlinearity" where "we must choose between alternate 
policy paths, none of which appear indisputably superior ... and all 
of which involve high levels of uncertainty."n By contrast, brown-
fields has made it to the seventh degree of relevance, with its cornu-
copia of state and federal law. We thus find ourselves at a crossroads 
of sorts. Do we need to agree about sustainable development's par-
ticulars before we can proceed to remediate brownfields? That is, 
should an idea at a higher degree of relevance pause and let a less de-
fined idea "catch up"? 
Professor Ruhl believes that we do not need to define sustain-
able development in consummate detail before proceeding. That 
view is, however, not universally accepted. Professor Dernbach, for 
example, claims sustainable development is so revolutionary that it 
literally requires us to reformulate our entire structure of govern-
ance.78 In his view, if we seek to build a sustainable society, we need 
to reinvent our current laws, beginning with a commitment by gov-
ernmental entities at all levels to develop omnibus sustainability 
75. See Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10,508. Besides their limited scope, few 
EPA sustainability initiatives "have the force of law." See Koch, supra note 33, at 190. 
76. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 293. 
77. Seeid. 
78. See generally Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1. 
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strategies.79 This "total makeover'' approach would address the lack 
of consistency among laws so frequently decried by commentators.80 
Those who want to "reinvent" regulation81 could agree to start over 
with sustainable development as an organizing principle. 
However, this policy path is an unlikely one. Historically, envi-
ronmental law has shown a propensity to evolve in a nonlinear fash-
ion that defies our attempts to impose order. Likewise, sustainable 
development law surely will develop through a similar process of 
evolution and experimentation. As one commentator observes, the 
"framework of a new paradigm of [sustainable development] law 
cannot be built in the proverbial 'day."'82 Two of our foremost envi-
ronmental law scholars have called upon other disciplines to explain 
this dynamic: Professor William Rodgers invokes the metaphors of 
evolutionary biology,83 and Professor Ruhl relies on the "complex 
adaptive systems" theory to illustrate environmental law's intrica-
cies.84 Professor Ruhl endorses an ex~erimental approach to sustain-
79. See id. at 33. 
80. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 93-94 (1990) {observing that "failures of coordination" lead to 
"inconsistency and incoherence in the law"). 
81. See id.at 84-102 {for a comprehensive discussion of the many criticisms of governmen-
tal regulation (including environmental statutes and regulations)); see also Ruhl, Thinking of 
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 980-91 (discussing "a plan for the revolution" of environ-
mental law that focuses on a number of perceived and actual shortcomings of the present 
regulatory structure). 
For discussions of regulatory reform initiatives, see generally Bradford C. Mank, The En-
vironmental Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need 
for Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 {1998); Robert V. Percival, Responding to 
Environmental Risk: A Pluralist Perspective, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 513, 526-27 (1997); Rena 
I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command 
to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103 {1998). See also Ruhl, Thinking of Environ-
mental Law, supra note 1, at 986-87. 
82. Robinson, Attaining Systems For Sustainability, supra note 56, at 140-41. 
83. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, Self-Deception, and Mythology: The Law of 
Salmon in the Pacific Northwest, 26 PAC. L.J. 821 (1995); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Envi-
ronmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas' Thumbs, Statlltory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 25 (1993); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lessons of the Red Squirrel: Con-
sensus and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 161 
(1989); William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Lesson of the Owl and the Crows: The Role of Deception 
in the Evolution of the Environmental Statutes, 4 FLA. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 377 (1989). 
84. Professor Ruhl's scholarship focuses on "complex adaptive systems" theory: the "body 
of literature and research devoted to 'the study of the behavior of macroscopic collections of 
[interacting] units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in time."' Ruhl, Thinking of 
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 936 n.8 (quoting PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, 
FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY 7 (1995)). Complexity theory aims to understand how complex 
systems-including legal systems-behave. See id. at 938. By definition, a complex system is 
dynamic and non-linear. See id. at 936. 
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ability programs, championing "adaptive management" - "'the con-
cept of experimentation to the design and implementation of natural-
resource and environmental policies"'85 -as the process for attaining 
sustainability. Ruhl comments that, "we do not really know how to 
get to either a sustainable economy or sustainable development. 
Failure to experiment, in other words, would be folly."86 Others 
might call this a path toward achieving a solution for a "second-best" 
world.87 
Brownfields proponents are quick to argue that this is exactly 
what they are doing: experimenting and reinventing law in the states' 
"laboratory of ideas."88 But, it is important that this reinvention in-
corporates the core principles of sustainable development. Experi-
ments in the brownfields arena will only crystallize into a body of sus-
tainable development law if these core principles are included and 
followed.89 To argue otherwise is to run the risk of negative conse-
quences stemming from the failure to adopt sustainable development 
as an organizing principle. We may disagree about the details of sus-
tainable development, but "[w]ithout some clarity and social consen-
sus about the characteristics of [sustainable] places, it will be difficult 
to achieve a more positive result ... [Sustainable development] is a 
Professor Ruhl's insights are elaborated further in J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Ar-
row of the Law in Modem Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Di-
minishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 405 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modem Administrative State, 
45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe 
the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 V AND. L. REV. 
1407 (1996). 
85. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 996 (quoting KAIN. LEE, 
COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE53 (1993)). 
86. Id. 
87. For a provocative discussion of "second-best" theory, see John J. Donohue III, Sym-
posium on Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: Some Thoughts on Law and Economics 
and the General Theory of Second Best, 73 Cm.-KENT. L. REV. 257 (1998) (introducing sympo-
sium on the theory and articles on pollution taxes and public utility regulation). 
88. This usage stems from an insight by Justice Brandeis. See New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (stating that, "It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country"). See also Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Developing Enforcement of Federal Envi-
ronmental Laws, 70 TuL. L. REV. 2373, 2383 (1996) (observing that, "Rare is the proponent of 
devolution [of environmental policy-making to the states] who does not refer to Justice Bran-
deis's observation that one of the benefits of federalism is that it allows states to serve as labo-
ratories of democracy for novel social and economic experiments"). 
89. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 293-94. 
Spring 1999) BROWNFIELDS POLICIES FOR SUSTAINABLE CITIES 205 
better model for planning and managing in the future, and [a] vast 
improvement over our current way of thinking about communities."90 
Unfortunately, we do not have the benefit of hindsight from fu-
ture decades, when there may .well be a fully developed body of sus-
tainable development law. For all we know, any of today's experi-
ments could be a precursor to a more evolved understanding of 
sustainable development, a false start or even a detour from the cor-
rect p~licy·path. Many earnest attempts to provide guidance follow 
an Agenda 21-like strategy, articulating an all-things-to-all-people list 
of prerequisites for sustainability. But other scholars have done an 
outstanding job of distilling the mandate of sustainable development 
down to three prerequisites for any program claiming to be a founda-
tion of sustainable development law. The first prerequisite builds 
upon the notion that regulators must make a "concerted effort to 
progressively integrate governmental decisionmaking [sic] on envi-
ronmental, social, and economic issues .... "91 The second prerequi-
site reflects the reality that governments must ensure that policy de-
cisions actually further sustainable development goals. The final 
prerequisite recognizes that programs must be designed to achieve 
"equity," the third element of the sustainable development agenda. 
In Part III, I deal with each of these elements in turn. 
III. BROWNFIELDS AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE PROCESS OF 
EXPERIMENTATION 
In this Part, I discuss the brownfields initiatives designed to 
lessen the fear of liability under state and federal environmental laws. 
This body of law is hardly monolithic. 92 Indeed, variations are so sig-
nificant that one cannot claim all brownfields policies are equally 
consistent with sustainable development principles. Thus, the inquiry 
begun in Part I is squarely in focus: what sustainable development 
principles matter, and how should the evolving hard law of brown-
fields reflect them? One thing is clear. If we continue to follow the 
status quo, the consequences may be serious. Under existing brown-
fields policies, thousands of sites may be remediated in state VCPs in 
a manner dangerous to urban residents. 
90. BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8, at 39. 
91. Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10507. 
92. Of course, the same could be said of other brownfields initiatives. See, e.g., EDITH M. 
PEPPER, LESSONS FROM TifE FIELD: UNLOCKING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL WITH AN EN-
VIRONMENTAL KEY 20-30 (1997) (listing ten types of public sector financing for brownfields 
projects). 
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A. Brownfields Programs Require Procedures Designed To Integrate 
Simultaneous Consideration Of Economic, Environmental, and 
Equity Goals ("Procedural Integration") 
The first core principle emanates from Chapter 8 of Agenda 21, 
"one of the more important sections of the document in terms of le-
gal implementation of sustainable development, ... "93 Chapter 8 
calls upon governments to: integrate environment and development 
at the policy, planning and management levels; adopt a national 
strategy for sustainable development; provide an effective legal and 
regulatory framework; make effective use of economic instruments in 
market and other incentives; [and] establish systems for integrated 
environmental and economic accounting.94 
Like most of Agenda 21, this principle is vague. What govern-
mental policies count, and how do they "integrate environment and 
development"? Doesn't much of modern American environmental 
law implement this mandate, i.e., the environmental impact state-
ment requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act 
("NEPA") serving to "[i]ntegrate environment and development,"95 
the Clean Air Act emissions trading system incorporating market in-
centives,96 and so forth? 
Interpreting Chapter 8, Professor Dernbach reaches a different 
conclusion. He calls upon governments at all levels to foster 
"procedural integration" by creating processes for simultaneous and 
coordinated consideration of social, environmental, and economic 
goals.97 A key feature of this is curbing regulatory tunnel vision. In 
this view, governments have fundamental responsibilities to ensure 
93. Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 323. 
94. See id. at 324. 
95. Several commentators have termed NEPA a precursor to an American sustainable 
development ideal. See Dembach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10520 (NEPA is "part of the 
legal and policy foundation necessary to build [a U.S. sustainable development] strategy."); 
Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 278 n.10 ("NEPA may play an impor-
tant role in rediscovering a pre-existing national commitment to ... sustainable develop-
ment."). 
96. Title IV of the Oean Air Act (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7671 (1996)) 
created the market-based system for trading sulfur dioxide allowances. See generally, James E. 
Krier, Marketable Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449 (1994); Henry E. Mazurek, Jr., 
The Future of Clean Air: The Application of Futures Markets to Title IV of the 1990 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (1994). 
97. Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 47; compare Eileen Gauna, The 
Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 3, 50 n. 214 (1997) (calling for integrated decision-making with respect to hazardous waste 
disposal site locations). 
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consideration of all environmental costs and benefits from a project's 
inception, in order to avoid making unsound and irreversible deci-
sions at an early stage.93 Integrated procedures also require coordina-
tion of decision-making authority to prevent a government's right 
hand from not knowing what the left hand is doing, as is the case, for 
example, when a national agriculture ministry subsidizes wasteful 
practices and leaves it up to the environment ministry to clean up the 
damage.99 As Professor Dembach demonstrates masterfully, many 
American environmental laws do not fully measure up to the stan-
dards of procedural integration.100 
In considering "procedural integration" in the brownfields set-
ting, I examine three significant steps: how states administer brown-
fields cleanups; how, with federal oversight, states determine clean-
ups' sufficiency; and how, if at all, localities review projects. 
1. The EP A's Failed Attempt to Insist on Uniform VCP 
Procedures 
When the brownfields remediation process begins, developers 
have already calculated project benefits and costs.101 States are not 
usually required to second-guess these assessments, confining their 
involvement with developers' applications to a completeness review. 
Often, there is also little meaningful review during the remediation 
process itself. Some states require developers to enter into enforce-
able consent agreements; others involve the state extensively in ap-
proving work plans and supervising the cleanup process. These states 
98. See id.; see also BEATLEY & MANNING, supra note 8, at 38 {"Sustainable Places Re-
flect and Promote a Full-Cost Accounting of the Social and Environmental Costs of Public and 
Private Decisions."); Tarlock, supra note 35, at 53 ("[T]he major challenge posed by the theory 
of sustainable development has been to systematically and permanently incorporate the full 
environmental consequences of resource use into the modern economic concepts that help to 
structure the politics of resource allocation."). 
99. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 46. But see Torres, supra 
note 51, at 616 (discussing the 1994 Executive Order on environmental justice and contending 
that "the requirement of inter-agency cooperation in data gathering and in the formulation of 
the problems that the agencies must address ... will help prevent the development of agency 
myopia [and] help illuminate how particular decisions of one agency or another produce envi-
ronmental consequences ... ") (footnote omitted). 
100. See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note l, at 47-51. NEPA is an excellet 
example of this failure of procedural intergration. Given NEP A's lack of substantive bite, Pro-
. fessor Caldwell is justified in his observation that "the principles and goals declared by NEPA 
will need reinforcement to work toward the goal of attaining a sustainable future." Lynton K. 
Caldwell, Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1998). 
101. Several leading texts on brownfields redevelopment provide extensive advice on esti-
mating the costs of brownfields projects. See, e.g., ABA BROWNFIELDS GUIDE, supra note 20. 
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are in the minority. Most allow the developer to operate more or less 
independently with little or no state oversight beyond a review of 
documentation submitted at the end of remediation activities.102 
The typical process thus falls far short of the procedural integra-
tion ideal. Throughout the life of the project, states delegate respon-
sibility for making significant decisions about environmental, eco-
nomic, and equity issues to developers. With the state's role being 
minimized or deferred to the end of the project, the process fails to 
consider costs and benefits ab initio or conduct full environmental ac-
counting throughout the process.103 
No single governmental agency engages in the searching project 
review required under Agenda 21. Of course, that is exactly what 
states want. They traffic in the late-90s lexicon of lightening govern-
mental burdens: VCPs are designed to "streamline" redevelopment104 
or "reduc[e] process barriers."105 Elaborate procedures would only 
hamper the goal of returning brownfields sites to commerce. 
Given the states' resistance to integrated procedures, the federal 
government is the only actor capable, by invoking its mandate under 
CERCLA, of ensuring that brownfields redevelopment achieves sus-
tainable development's procedural objectives.106 But federal in-
volvement in overseeing brownfields cleanups is anathema to the 
states,1()7 as shown perhaps most vividly by a recent debacle involving 
an EPA policy proposal. 
In September 1997, the EPA promulgated a draft guidance 
102. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 965-70 (discussing three levels of 
state involvement in VCPs, and contrasting procedures adopted in "high" involvement states to 
those of "low" involvement states where developers act essentially independently); but cf. 
Koch, supra note 33, at 196 (the new Florida statute "differs from other voluntary cleanup ini-
tiatives that permit the purchaser to instigate and implement a brownfields cleanup with little 
or no government involvement ... "). 
103. See Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at 47-48. 
104. See Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: 
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705, 707 (1994). 
105. See SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 8, at 20. 
106. See Buzbee, Institutional Determinism, supra note 3, at 61 ("[I]f a national goal of pro-
tection from hazardous substances remains, limited federal oversight of Brownfields and state 
cleanup initiatives is appropriate."). 
107. See, e.g., Mark D. Anderson, The Limits of Innovative Cleanup Laws: A State Update, 
ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LmG. STRATEGY, Mar. 1997, at 5 ("Involving the federal authorities 
(and an additional layer of bureaucracy) is, however, an unattractive option for a cleanup being 
conducted under state authority."). · 
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document108 specifying conditions under which it would enter into an 
amended "Superfund Memorandum of Agreement" ("SMOA") be-
yond those already in place with eleven states.109 A SMOA delineates 
the nature of federal-state relations with respect to cleanups of sites 
on the National Priorities List ("NPL").110 In SMOA amendments, 
the EPA provides protection against federal liability for VCP partici-
pants by agreeing to refrain from pursuing enforcement actions at 
certain brownfields sites successfully addressed in VCPs.111 
The EPA received 78 comments on the draft, many calling for its 
withdrawal. One former state official stated bluntly, "[i]f the bureau-
crats in EPA have a lick of common sense they will rescind this guid-
ance. "112 He was not alone. Other commenters termed the draft 
108. See Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda of Agreement 
(SMOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495 (1997) 
(hereinafter EPA Draft SMOA Guidance). 
109. See id. at 47498-500. The existing SMOA amendments follow a structure similar to 
that of the SMOAs themselves, clarifying state and federal agencies' responsibilities at VCP 
sites. For example, the SMOA addendum entered into between the Minnesota Pollution Con-
trol Agency (MPCA) and EPA Region V designates the MPCA as the lead agency for clean-
ups taking place under the authority of Minnesota's VCP, the Voluntary Investigation and 
Cleanup (VIC) program. See Eisen, Brownjields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 964 n.348 
(discussing the adoption of the Minnesota SMOA addendum). 
110. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47497. See generally HAROLD C. 
BARNEIT, TOXIC DEBTS AND THE SUPERFUND DILEMMA 96-99 (1994) (describing states' re-
sponsibilities for such activities as identifying candidate sites for the NPL and taking lead roles 
in certain cleanups). The NPL is "the list, compiled by EPA pursuiint to CERCLA section 105 
[42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1998)], of uncontrolled hazardous substance releases in the United States 
that are priorities for long-term remedial evaluation and response." EPA Draft SMOA Guid-
ance, supra note 108, at 47497. A SMOA "is not a site-specific document," but "attachments 
may address specific sites." Id. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 300505 (1998) (SMOA regulations). 
111. The language proposed for each SMOA amendment regarding liability protection was 
the following: "EPA does not generally anticipate taking removal or remedial action at sites 
involved in State Voluntary Cleanup Programs addressed by a signed EPA/State Superfund 
Memorandum of Agreement." EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47497. 
Commenters criticized the promise to "generally" refrain from enforcement action as 
vague and amounting to an unenforceable "policy statement." See, e.g., id. at 47498 (public 
comment of Richard W. Collins, Director, Waste Management Administration, State of Mary-
land, Department of the Environment, MOA-2-43, at 2); see also Anderson, supra note 107, at 
4 ("Unfortunately, then, the typical SMOA does not commit the EPA in any way to honor a 
cleanup in a state VCP"). This limitation on liability was expressly made subject to four 
"reopeners," which commenters termed so broad that the EPA could act virtually whenever it 
considered it necessary. See, e.g., Jean Koeninger, Manager, Superfund Branch, Hazardous 
Waste Division, Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology, Comment on EPA 
Draft SM OA Guidance, EPA Docket MOA-2-70) (describing the EP A's "implied threat"). 
112 Clinton W. Willer, Former Director, Division of Superfund, State of Tennessee 
Author, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, Oct. 10, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-6, at 2 
[hereinafter Willer Comment] (copy on file with author). 
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guidance a "disastrous mistake"113 that would do "severe damage to 
state brownfield initiatives"114 and "create further obstacles to 
achieving brownfields redevelopment."115 
The first area of controversy was the EPA proposal to limit its 
approval to lower-risk brownfields sites. The guidance featured a 
multi-step "screening process" for states to use to distinguish be-
tween higher-risk "Tier I" sites and lower-risk "Tier II" sites; only 
the latter would be eligible for liability protection.116 The EPA also 
stated, "[i]f the EPA subsequently determines that a site was im-
properly classified as 'Tier II', the [liability protection] do[ es] not ap-
ply. "117 This proposal drew strong criticism from many commenters 
who feared it would empower the EPA to substitute its judgments 
about environmental costs and benefits for those of the states.118 The 
EPA proposed to make its judgments in a manner consistent with its 
CERCLA mandate, intending to differentiate sites with "greater po-
tential to require long-term or emergency cleanup work under the 
Federal Superfund program"119 from those earning its sign-off. This is 
113. See id. at 1. 
114. Alan C. Williams, Ass't Atty. Gen., Minnesota, on behalf of eight state attorneys gen-
eral, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, Oct. 24, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-27 at 5 
(hereinafter State Attorneys General Comment]. 
115. Mark D. Anderson, Counsel, The Greenfields Group, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA 
Guidance, October 9, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-7. The influential Environmental Council of 
the States (ECOS) called upon the EPA to "withdraw the Guidance in its current form," 
terming it "an unprecedented federal intrusion into the conduct of state cleanup programs 
which serves to undermine effective state initiatives to address the reuse and redevelopment of 
contaminated properties." Id. at 3 (public comment of Robert E. Roberts, Executive Director, 
Environmental Council of the States, MOA-2-4). ECOS, whose members consist of 51 state 
and territorial environmental commissioners, was formed in 1993 to promote an increased state 
role in environmental policy-making. See Tom Arrandale, Pollution Control Has Been Steadily 
Propelled Away From Washington to the States, GOVERNING, Oct. 1997, at 36. 
116. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47496 (discussing the qualification 
on the liability limit); id. at 47502 (the screening process "consists of multiple steps in which 
each successive step involves more detailed information about a site and its environs"); id. at 
47502-06 (outlining the screening process). See also Anderson, supra note 107, at 4 (EPA Re-
gion 4 had suggested a site screening proeess to Kentucky during SMOA negotiations). 
117. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47498. 
118. The U.S. Conference of Mayors, for example, commented it was "fundamentally op-
posed to any up front tiering of sites." J. Thomas Cochran, Executive Director, U.S. Confer-
ence of Mayors, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, October 24, 1997, EPA Docket 
MOA-2-23 at 3 [hereinafter U.S. Conference or Mayors Comment]. See Robert J. Eaton, 
Chairman, Detroit Renaissance, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, September 30, 
1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-25 at 1 (claiming the EPA could pursue an enforcement action at 
every brownfields site)[hereinafter Detroit Renaissance Comment]. 
119. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47501. States criticized the Tier I 
definition for taking into account such factors as a site's proximity to a day care center. See id. 
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an important analysis that would have allowed for consideration of 
all environmental impacts of brownfields projects. 
Recognizing the extensive differences in VCPs, the EPA had 
also agreed to sign off only on sites remediated in approved programs 
which contained six specified features. 120 This drew heavy fire from 
commenters, one of whom observed that the federal baseline would 
"give[] EPA veto power over state laws."121 The EPA planned to 
approve a VCP only if it "provide[ d] opportunities for meaningful 
community involvement ... responsive to the risk posed by the site 
contamination and the level of public interest," including notice and 
other requirements.122 The EPA's proposal recognized that many 
VCPs require notice or a brief notice-and-comment period, while 
others require no public outreach efforts whatsoever.123 Thus deci-
sions on site uses and cleanup standards are often precluded from 
community scrutiny, the first issue having been decided by develop-
ers and the second often determined by a generic cleanup standard.124 
The EPA's attempt to bring community members into the process 
was overwhelmingly rejected as tending to "indirectly impose cost 
and procedural impediments on brownfields developers."125 
Other criteria called on states to "provide adequate oversight to 
ensure that voluntary response actions . . . are conducted in such a 
manner to assure protection of human health, welfare and the envi-
at 47502 (factors leading to designation as a Tier I site); State Attorneys General Comment, 
supra note 114, at 3. 
120. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47497 ("This guidance is intended 
to be flexible enough to accommodate variability among State voluntary cleanup programs; 
however, the guidance does describe a minimum set of criteria that a State voluntary cleanup 
program should meet before EPA signs an MOA with the State concerning its voluntary 
cleanup program."). The draft guidance also recognized that brownfields policies are con:. 
stantly changing, providing for periodic EPA reviews of its approval and for a review if a state 
made "significant changes" to its VCP. Id. at 47498-99. 
121. Gov. E. Benjamin Nelson, Chair, Comm. on Nat. Res. and Gov. Mark Racicot, Vice 
Chair, Comm. on Nat. Res., Nat'I Governor's Ass'n, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guid-
ance, Oct. 3, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-22 at 1. 
122. See EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108 at 47499. Ten methods of public in-
volvement were deemed acceptable. Id. 
123. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 972-77 (discussing public participa-
tion provisions in VCPs). See generally BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 20 
(discussing state VCP public participation requirements and comparing them to those of 
CERCLA). 
124. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 998-1020. 
125. Detroit Renaissance Comment, supra note 118, at 2. While most commenters objected 
to requiring public participation, not all did so. See U.S. Conference of Mayors Comment, su-
pra note 118 at 4 (the minimal requirement of notice gave localities flexibility); Mary Beth 
Tuohy, Ass't Comm'r., Indiana Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guid-
ance, Oct. 24, 1997, EPA Docket MOA-2-52 at 2. · 
212 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:187 
ronment ... " by, among other means, incorporating the CERCLA 
preference for permanent cleanups, and including "a requirement 
that the State program receives progress reports on site conditions, or 
[reserves] the State program's right to conduct site inspections."126 
The states rejected these proposals. Once again, they resisted any 
EPA role in deciding whether a brown.fields cleanup protects human 
health and the environment.127 As I demonstrate more fully in the 
next section, the EPA proposal responded to an important proce-
dural shortcoming of state programs, namely, the lack of consistent 
and effective means to guarantee that cleanups remain protective 
over time.128 
Bowing to the inevitable, the EPA withdrew the draft in J anu-
ary 1998.129 Though no one recognized it as such, this experience can 
be reconceptualized as an early battle to stake out positions in the 
evolution of sustainable development law. One could easily recast 
the EPA's proposals on major areas of disagreement as attempts to 
bring "procedural integration" to the brown.fields process, and states' 
responses as demonstrating strong resistance. After this debacle, 
there is no consistent "procedural integration" in brown.fields poli-
cies, nor can most developers have the protection from CERCLA li-
ability they desire. 
To break this logjam, some change along the substantive lines of 
the failed guidance is necessary. The brown.fields process need not 
be federalized.130 Instead, Congress could either amend CERCLA to 
126. EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47,500. 
127. See, e.g., David B. Struhs, Comm'r., Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, Mass. Dept. of 
Envtl. Protection, Comment on EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, Oct. 23, 1997, EPA Docket 
MOA-2-16 at 5 (calling the EPA's attempt to impose these criteria "condescending"). 
128. See infra notes 145-169 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of ensuring 
protectiveness of brownfields cleanups in the future). 
129. See Withdrawal of Proposal: Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memo-
randa of Agreement Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, Memorandum From 
Timothy Fields, Jr., Acting Ass't Adm'r., EPA Ofc. Of Solid Waste and Emerg. Response, and 
Steven A. Herman, Ass't Adm'r., EPA Ofc. Of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, to 
EPA Regional Administrators, Regions 1-10, Nov. 26, 1997 (on file with author). 
130. Professor Buzbee has proposed a "Cleanup Approval Process," a federally-sanctioned 
method of remediating brownfields sites that would parallel the structure of other federal envi-
ronmental laws. See William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination 
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 35, 
100-04 {i995) [hereinafter Buzbee, Remembering Repose]. 
As Professor Buzbee later observed, "[c]ritical to rehabilitating Brownfields are questions 
about which levels or units of government should be involved in such efforts." Buzbee, Institu-
tional Determinism, supra note 3, at 1. Evolving notions of environmental federalism probably 
require a split of responsibility between federal and state governments in this area. See Daniel 
C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 613 (1996) (noting that 
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empower the EPA to approve states' VCPs and extend liability pro-
tection to developers at sites in those states or adopt Professor Rob-
ert Abrams' proposals designed to minimize federal involvement at 
brownfields sites.131 Unfortunately, recent legislative proposals aim 
to reduce the federal role in brownfields policy,132 so this type of leg-
islative action is unlikely. Congress is moving in the wrong direction 
for consistency with sustainable development's "procedural integra-
tion" principle. 
2. Addressing Shortcomings of Localities' Site-Specific 
Approaches 
A second procedural problem stems from the fact that to each 
stakeholder, the question about issues such as cleanup standards and 
liability is the same: what is the impact of this project, on this neigh-
borhood, on this site?133 The potential consequences of a site-specific 
inquiry are serious. If a number of brownfields are located close to-
gether in an inner-city neighborhood, the parcel-by-parcel approach 
ignores the potential synergistic effect of multiple sources of con-
tamination in proximity to each other.134 Some would argue that 
"every regulatory decision represents a conglomeration of various policy activities, some -of 
which will benefit from decentralized processes and others of which will be optimized under a 
centralized regime"). 
131. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1028-30; Abrams, supra note 16, at 
289-90. 
132. The most recent CERCLA reauthorization bill, S. 8, the "Superfund Cleanup Accel-
eration Act of 1997," would have prevented the EPA from disapproving state VCPs. Once a 
site was "subject to a state remedial action plan or ... the state has provided certification or 
similar documentation that response action has been completed under a state remedial action 
plan," federal civil and crintlnal actions would be barred. S. 8, 105th Cong., §103 (proposing to 
add CERCLA section 129). The EPA could only evaluate state VCPs for the limited purpose 
of deciding whether to award a state a grant from $25,000,000 in new funding authorized wider 
the statute. Id. at § 102 (proposing to add CERCLA section 128); see also Eric D. Madden, 
Comment, The Voluntary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment Act-The Limits of the Kansas 
Brownfields Law, 46 KAN. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1998). See generally Rhoads & Shogren, supra 
note 33 (discussing brownfields provisions of S. 8 and S. 18, a stand-alone brownfields bill, and 
noting administration opposition to the proposed role for the EPA). 
133. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and Justice, 
25 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. REV. 589, 617-18 (1998) (" [D]ecisions regarding cleanup standards 
and liability [should be] dealt with from a community-based, rather than a parcel-by-parcel, 
perspective."). 
134. For an excellent analysis criticizing Oregon's brownfields statute on these grounds, see 
Alexander H. Tynberg, Comment, Oregon's New Cleanup Law: Short-Term Thinking at the 
Expense of Long-Term Environmental and Economic Prosperity, 12 J. ENVrL. L. & LmG. 471 
nn. 128 - 30 (1997) ("The law must not assume that the particular site under analysis is the only 
source detrimentally affecting human health and the environment. Nevertheless, that is what 
the new cleanup law does."); see also Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 909 n.123 
and sources cited therein (criticizing CERCLA risk assessments on these grounds). 
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zoning frameworks ensure citywide analyses of brownfields projects. 
As my former student Patrick Skelley has demonstrated, however, 
rezoning is not necessary for most brownfields projects.135 
The site-specific inquiry is antithetical to the community-wide 
approach of evaluating environmental impacts that sustainable de-
velopment requires.136 As one brownfields proponent observes, "You 
can't address one isolated brownfield and expect it to survive 
alone."137 In a recent article, my colleague Michael Allan Wolf rec-
ognizes the need for a citywide approach to evaluating the impacts of 
brownfields reuse and redevelopment. He proposes a "Protective 
Land-Use Scheme," the "heart" of which is a new zoning classifica-
tion, the "Brownfield Investment Zone" (BIZ), to "create a uniform 
method for assuring a zone of comfort around certain brownfields. "138 
The BIZ proposal uses regulatory tools already in place and could 
govern today's brownfields experiments. The same cannot be said of 
citywide sustainability planning processes which are underway in only 
a few cities (besides Chattanooga, notable examples include Seattle 
and San Francisco ).139 The BIZ proposal also uses a process which, 
despite its well-known drawbacks,140 is oriented to contemplation of 
Of course, there is widespread concern that current environmental laws fail to take ac-
count of problems posed by the interaction of multiple chemicals and the presence of multiple 
so.urces of contamination. See, e.g., Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework For Preventing 
Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (1992} ("[T]he present 
(environmental law] approach often fails to account for multiple sources of exposure."); Robert 
R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. 
ILL. L. REv. 103, 121 (risk assessment policies "rarely take synergism into account"); William 
D. Ruckelshaus, Twentieth Anniversary Commemorative: The Role of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 725, 725 (1992) (statement by a former EPA 
Administrator that "[w]e know very little about the additive and synergistic effects of diverse 
contaminants in our environment"). 
135. See generally Patrick J. Skelley II, Public Participation in Brownfield Remediation 
Systems, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 389 (1997). Florida's brownfields statute is relatively un-
usual in that it explicitly requires that a brownfields developer demonstrate that 
"redevelopment of the proposed brownfield site is consistent with the local comprehensive plan 
and is a permittable use under the applicable local land development regulations ..•. " FLA. 
STAT. ch. 376.80(2)(b} (1998). As Skelley observes, the latter burden would not be difficult to 
meet in most cases. 
136. See generally Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1; Eisen, Brownfields of 
Dreams, supra note 1. But see Eisen, Toward a Sustainable Urbanism, supra note 41, at 82-83 
("[at] the project design stage []we must respond in a 'bottom up' fashion, ensuring that de-
velopment takes place with sensitivity to the urban ecosystem.") (footnotes omitted). 
137. Pepper, supra note 92, at 26. 
138. Wolf, supra note 7, at 40, 41. 
139. See Sustainable Seattle (last modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://www.scn.org/sustainablc/ 
susthome.html>; Sustainable City (last modified Mar. 28, 1999} <http://www.sustainable-city. 
org/> (setting forth a "5-year Sustainability Plan for the City of San Francisco"). 
140. As Professor Wolf observes, "zoning classifications are by no means chiseled in stone; 
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citywide impacts in a forum that allows for public input.141 Thus, the 
BIZ idea should receive further consideration as a practical alterna-
tive to the parcel-by-parcel approach to brownfields redevelop-
ment.142 
B. Brownfields Programs Require Procedures Designed To Ensure 
Sustainable Urban Futures ("Substantive Integration") 
Professor Dernbach defines the second core concept of sustain-
able development law-the mandate to ensure a sustainable future-
as the requirement of "substantive integration."143 The challenge is 
"developing principles for determining appropriate trade-offs among 
goals in specific decisions," or ensuring that "the sum of many deci-
sions ought to further [social, economic, and environmental] goals."144 
In the brownfields setting, as Professor Wolf recognizes, this means 
"accommodat[ing] the deep desire for economic growth in the inner 
city and the need to protect human health and assure a cleaner urban 
environment for current and future generations."145 
Is this balance being struck appropriately? Consider a hypo-
thetical buyer of a brownfields site ("Purchaser") who wishes to buy 
a brownfields site successfully remediated under an "industrial" 
cleanup standard, raze the buildings on the site, and construct con-
dominiums. Many states require a higher degree of cleanup for this 
residential use. Therefore, the state must guarantee that Purchaser 
will do any additional cleanup necessary. My point is a simple one 
that is often overlooked or trivialized: brownfields remediation is not 
a public use restriction placed on an industrial brownfield is only as permanent as the predilec-
tion of a majority of the local legislature." Wolf, supra note 7, at 39. 
141. See, e.g., Skelley, supra note 135. 
142. The new Florida brownfields statute comes close to this approach, requiring a local 
government to adopt a resolution designating a "brownfield area," "a contiguous area of one or 
more brownfield sites, some of which may not be contaminated, and which has been designated 
by a local government by resolution," before redevelopment may proceed. FLA. STAT. ch. 
376.79(4) (1998). The statute adopts the EPA's definition of "brownfield sites": "generally 
abandoned, idled, or underused industrial and commercial properties :where expansion or re-
development is complicated by actual or perceived environmental contamination." FLA. STAT. 
ch. 376.79(3) (1998). 
143. See Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at 51. 
144. Id. at 52. 
145. Wolf, supra note 7, at 23. This formula reflects the ubiquitous phrase 
"intergenerational equity" and its preference for avoiding deferring environmental damage to 
the future. See generally Enrrn BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTuRE GENERATIONS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); 
Edith Brown Weiss, Sustainable Development Symposium: A Reply to Barresi's "Beyond Fair-
ness to Future Generations," 11 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 89 (1997) (defending the role of intergenera-
tional equity in sustainable development policies). 
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sustainable development unless it ensures that urban residents will 
enjoy a safe and healthy environment in the future. 
To brownfields boosters, though, dealing with the past is what 
matters. Their view of the remediation process looks primarily to the 
past: cleaning up contamination at abandoned sites to spur their re-
development and working around real or perceived barriers. This is 
not to say that the future is completely irrelevant. State VCPs that 
use generic cleanup standards make the future use of each site a con-
sideration.146 Beyond this, however, the future is of little import, as 
little attention is paid to the condition of brownfields sites after initial 
cleanups. 
There are three primary concerns about the post-remediation fu-
ture of a brownfields site. The first and perhaps the only one which is 
adequately addressed in current programs is the likelihood that the 
initial cleanup will fail. In virtually every VCP statute, there is a re-
opener clause designed to guard against remedy failures by allowing 
the state to vacate liability protection extended to a developer if the 
remedy fails or if previously undiscovered contamination is found at 
the site.147 At this early stage, there is limited hard evidence suggest-
ing states will diligently police brownfields sites with remedies in 
place. It seems more likely that states' attention and limited en-
forcement resources will be diverted to more serious problems than 
sites thought to be successfully remediated. States already tout their 
track records in getting sites back into commerce, but rarely mention 
the steps taken to combat backsliding.148 
The second concern is that the initial cleanup may not be suffi-
cient for a subsequent property use, as in my example involving Pur-
chaser.149 Many states rely on the common law of property, providing 
146. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 941 n.247 (citing the examples of 
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Michigan); Wolf, supra note 7, at 35 n.125 (citing Ohio's regulations, 
Omo ADMIN. CODE§ 3745-300-08(B)(3)(c)-(d)(1998), which promulgate different soil cleanup 
standards for residential and commercial land uses). 
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3)(b)-(c) (1998). 
148. See, e.g., PENN. DEP'T. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, LAND RECYCLING PROGRAM, OLD 
SITES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES 1-6 (1998) (listing program achievements in the annual report but 
not mentioning steps taken to protect against remedy failures). 
149. SeeTynberg, supra note 134, at488 (criticizing the view that "so long as the remedy is 
protective of health and the environment for all current exposure scenarios and for all exposure 
scenarios that are reasonably likely to occur in the foreseeable future, there is absolutely no 
valid reason why society should demand more" on the basis that "[i]ncorporating future use 
into remedy selection is practically impossible because there is so much uncertainty involved 
(and] (o]ne cannot ensure that any industrial area is 'reasonably anticipated' to remain indus-
trial in fifty years."). 
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that a limitation of the property to specified uses will be recorded 
with the deed and run with the land.150 Professor Wolf and I argue 
this servitude-based approach might not allow adjoining residents to 
prevent undesirable impacts.151 In the failed SMOA guidance, the 
EPA also found the use of common law tools insufficient. It sug-
gested that states should reserve "authority to remove the cleanup 
certification under certain circumstances, such as a change in the 
site's use, a failure of institutional controls, or the discovery of addi-
tional contamination."152 Some statutes, such as Florida's new brown-
fields statute, do include reopeners of this sort.153 
The third important question is whether brownfields cleanups 
will result in reduced urban pollution. Experience to date shows in-
dustrial redevelopment is common at brownfields sites, raising the 
possibility of "repollution. "154 Lessons From the Field's case studies 
demonstrate that industrial users are prized for jobs and tax revenues 
they provide.155 Yet no developer need prove it will not contaminate a 
site. As one might imagine, the typical reopener clause does give the 
state authority to pursue an enforcement action against a repol-
luter .156 Assuming the state was inclined to flex its regulatory muscle 
at a brownfields site, which, as noted above, is not necessarily a good 
assumption, it would face significant hurdles, including the problem 
of distinguishing between historical and post-cleanup contamination. 
This determination would be particularly difficult if the nature of the 
development on the site was such that it obscured the contamina-
tion.157 
150. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 949; Wolf, supra note 3, at 38. 
151. Professor Wolf explains: 
[A]s every first-year, property law student schooled in the intricacies of com-
mon-law servitudes could testify, the most common form of use restriction found 
in private law-the real covenant- is an eminently unwieldy and unreliable 
mechanism to bind subsequent purchasers of the brownfield parcel to the prom-
ises made by the original redeveloper. 
Wolf, supra note 3, at 39. 
152 EPA Draft SMOA Guidance, supra note 108, at 47500. 
153. See FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3)(d)-(e) (1998); see also Koch, supra note 33, at 207. 
154. See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 3, at 22 n.90 (citing Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra 
note 3, at 1004 n.552). 
155. In eight case studies, the designated use of the site after remediation was "industrial"; 
in several others, part of the site was dedicated to industrial uses. See Pepper, supra note 92, at 
5-6. 
156. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 963 n.341 and statutes cited therein; 
see also FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3)(e) (1998) (state can require additional cleanup upon the re-
lease of new contaminants at a site). 
157. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1025 n. 675 and sources cited 
218 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:187 
Marginalizing concern for the future in these ways mortgages the 
sustainability of cities in favor of short-term gains. Fortunately, one 
commentator proposes a comprehensive solution to this problem. 
Professor Wolfs PLUS scheme contains a set of six features designed 
to complement the zoning designation and ensure the protection of 
brownfields cleanups.158 For example, to ensure that improper use is 
not made of a parcel remediated to a use-specific cleanup level, he 
proposes a "devastation easement," a new form of conservation 
easement in which "any inherent 'right' to develop or use the BIZ 
parcel for anything other than industrial purposes will be transferred 
... from the landowner to a governmental unit, preferably the state, 
with local neighborhood organizations as co-owners."159 To combat 
the potential for repollution at brownfields sites, he proposes that 
each developer post a performance bond that "could 'roll over' into a 
'perpetual maintenance' policy, .... "160 
These · are excellent ideas directly oriented to achieving 
"substantive integration" objectives. I would add another: states and 
localities must develop measurable indicators of progress to ensure 
that brownfields initiatives are evaluated and updated in a meaning-
ful way.161 Professor Ruhl sees this as critical to an adaptive approach 
to attaining sustainability, observing: 
therein. 
158. The goals of PLUS are to "(1) protect[] local residents from the increased risks attrib-
utable to brownfields .remediation at lower-than-CERCLA levels, and (2) guarantee( ] that 
only industrial uses will be permitted on the reused site." The complete set of features includes 
the following: 
(1) "devastation easements," (2) CIS-enhanced brownfields inventories; (3) a 
"Megan's Law" for brownfields, even formerly contaminated, reused sites; (4) ease-
ments onet-asides in fee to create buffer zones; (5) pre-construction bonds to guaran-
tee remediation completion and to fund perpetual maintenance; and (6) environ-
mental awareness and safety programs. 
See Wolf, supra note 3 at 42, 44-47. But see Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 
1023-24 (calling for enhanced risk communication programs, similar to the sixth element of the 
PLUS scheme). 
159. Wolf, supra note 3 at 44. 
160. Id. at 47. The ASTM's "Standard Guide to the Process of Sustainable Brownfields 
Redevelopment" encourages developers to maintain environmental insurance for this purpose. 
See Standard Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 6. 
161. I am hardly alone in calling for the development of appropriate sustainability indica-
tors. See, e.g., Dembach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1 at; Ruhl, Thinking of E11vi-
ronme11tal Law, supra note 1, at 997-98. Indicators allow for an evolutionary approach to sus-
tainability policies: 
By establishing numerical goals and indicators for topics such as economic viability or 
environmental quality, a state or city can contrast current development conditions 
with desired performance, show trends over time, allow comparisons between differ-
ent regions, judge the sustainability of current practices, and develop new indicators if 
necessary. 
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As Professor James Salzman has posited, ... valuations of 'nature's 
services' can be used to create indices of ecosystem sustainability, 
which, when combined with improved economic and social sustain-
ability indices, can be used the same way Wall Street uses stock 
performance indices to make adaptive decisions.162 
219 
Developing "indices of ecosystem sustainability" is obviously not 
something accomplished overnight.163 The type of indicators needed 
is radically different from any information currently available in the 
brownfields arena, which suffers from the '"bean counter' mentality" 
often used to evaluate the performance of environmental laws.164 
States measure success by such indicia as the number of applications 
to take part in a VCP and the number of sites remediated.165 This is 
the wrong benchmark for an adaptive policy approach because it 
does not value "nature's services."166 
C. The Link Between Brownfields Policies And Environmental 
Justice Is Still Tenuous ("Equity") 
Finally, a commitment to sustainable development is incomplete 
without attention to the "equity" component of sustainable develop-
ment.167 Environmental justice advocates tend to perceive brown-
fields programs in a manner that differs from the view taken by the 
adamant supporters of those programs. Adamant supporters see 
Sustainable Development Explored In Virginia, supra note 63, at 1. See also Ruhl, Thinking of 
Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 997 (terming indicators indispensable to an adaptive ap-
proach); Elizabeth Kline, Why Sustainable Community Indicators?: People Need A Reality 
Check (last modified November 13, 1998) <http://www.sustainable.doe.gov/articles 
/whysust.htm> ([I]ndicators "ensure that incremental steps are moving in desired directions and 
... hold ... [people] accountable for choices .... "). 
162. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 999 (citing James Salzman, 
Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming)). 
163. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52 n.89 (discussing the "difficulties of developing 
criteria to measure sustainable development" and citing PE1ER BAR1ELMUS, ENVIRONMENT, 
GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CONCEPTS AND STRA1EGIES OF SUSTAINABILITY (1994)); 
see also Lash, supra note 2, at 84. 
An interesting information source about indicators is Indicators of Sustainability (visited 
July 8, 1998) <http://www.subjectmatters.com/indicators/HTMLSrc/Indicators.html>. 
164. See Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 997. 
165. See, e.g., PENN. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PR01ECTION, supra note 148, at 1-2 (setting forth 
the number of remediated sites and program applications in Pennsylvania's Land Recycling 
Program); see also New Jersey Brownfields Law Wins Muted Praise, THE BROWNFIELDS 
LETTER, Nov. 1998, at 3 (citing a "potential increase in [brownfields] development," based on a 
co=ent of legislative analyst Terri Smith that the New Jersey DEP "signed 1,342 memoran-
dums of agreement, ... up from 1,112 in the same period of 1997"). 
166. See Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law, supra note 1, at 999. 
167. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290 n.52 ("social equity is 
the important third leg of sustainable development policy"). 
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economic opportunity in the "distressed property market," promot-
ing the "3R's" for success: remove barriers, redevelop, and reap the 
rewards.168 To environmental justice advocates, the core question is 
very different. They ask "will brownfields reclamation provide tan-
gible benefits, in terms of economic development or environmental 
quality, for the communities where brownfields are located, or will 
reclamation mostly benefit investors from outside the communi-
ties?"169 
Community activists are in a "double bind"110 because they must 
decide whether brownfields programs will provide hope and oppor-
tunity to distressed neighborhoods, or exacerbate environmental con-
tamination (with cleanup standards lower than CERCLA's171) and 
make investors wealthy at the expense of urban residents. Brown-
fields has become big business, yielding lots of "green" to an entire 
cottage industry of investors, lawyers, engineers, financial analysts, 
and consultantsm that reaps profits from brownfields remediation. 
Profits are often more important to brownfields entrepreneurs than 
168. See Kibel, supra note 133, at 612. Even the PCSD's summary of brownfields pro-
grams' raison d'etre concentrates on eliminating barriers to redevelopment; neither the recom-
mendation, the action items, nor the report text mentions "equity" or "environmental justice." 
See SUSTAINABLE AMERICA, supra note 8. 
Applying the 3R's standard, some brownfields boosters remain unsatisfied with the incen-
tives packages, liability limits, and relaxed cleanup standards of VCPs. See, e.g., Koch, supra 
note 33, at 205 (noting that critics such as Robert Wells believe "Florida's Act still lacks ade-
quate incentives for developers."); New Jersey brownfields law, supra note 165, at 4 (describing 
large industrial companies as "uninipressed" by New Jersey's brownfields program). 
169. Kibel, supra note 133, at 605-06. For other discussions of advocates' concerns, see 
Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1000-20; Anne L. Kelly, Reinvention in tlze 
Name of Environmental Justice: A View From State Government, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 769 
(1995); Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal: A Comment on tlze Urban Redevelop-
ment Aspect of Brownfields Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1996); Wolf, supra note 3, at 
21-26. 
170. See Wolf, supra note 3, at 21-26 (discussing the clash in philosophies that creates an 
environmental justice "double bind" in brownfields policies); see also Kibel, supra note 133, at 
607-08 ("[o]n the one hand, brownfields reclamation provided an opportunity to clean up and 
improve economic and environmental conditions in many poor and minority neighborhoods. 
On the other hand, brownfields reclamation also called for less stringent cleanup standards and 
shielding banks and investors from remediation liability."). 
171. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 936-49 for an analysis of "risk-
based" cleanup standards that allow brownfields sites to be remediated to levels less than those 
required by § 121 of CERCLA and its state analogues; see also Wolf, supra note 3, at 32. As 
one observer puts it, "[i]nterest in brownfields redevelopment ... is moving cleanup standard 
policy in a new direction," that being the substitution of "risk-based" approaches for those con-
servative standards based on "worst-case scenarios." Kass et al., supra note 17, at 348. 
172 See, e.g., Standards Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 5 (terming Michael Taylor, the 
chair of the ASTM committee drafting the brownfields standard, a "brownfields development 
consultant"). 
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community concerns about fast-track project approvals or reduced 
cleanup standards.173 As one resident of a San Francisco neighbor-
hood put it: 
As far as I'm concerned, a brownfield is just a Superfund site. A:fii-
can-Americans bore the brunt of the poison and pollution when 
they were Superfund sites, but now they are not going to be a part 
of cleanup and redevelopment. From my neighborhood's perspec-
tive, brownfields redevelopment means that A:fiican-Americans are 
being passed over and moved out.174 
I have observed that "environmental justice advocates who view 
streamlined and lenient cleanup processes as adding to the commu-
nity's environmental burden may be on a 'collision course' with 
brownfield redevelopment proponents."175 However, as another 
commentator observes, the two camps are not at "opposite ends on a 
spectrum of good and evil."176 Communities often need private sector 
capital to make projects work and investors need community ap-
proval to make some projects viable. 
Closing the gap between these groups by requiring states to ad-
dress legitimate community concerns might satisfy environmental jus-
tice advocates. But would it achieve "equity" in the sustainable de-
velopment context? The best answer is a qualified "yes, for now." In 
his article for this special issue, Professor Ruhl discusses the relation-
ship between environmental justice and sustainable development's 
"equity" component.in This is a welcome development. To date, 
those scholars who have discussed the relationship between the two 
173. A presenter at the EPA's "Brownfields '97" conference summed up the situation as 
follows: 
[T]here are profits to be made for shrewd real estate investors who can envision the 
market value of the property after cleanup, buy it very low at a stigmatized price, im-
plement project cleanup, obtain agency sign offs, and then sell the property at only a 
small reduction in sales price or value. 
Kass et al., supra note 17, at 346. In this respect, brownfields investors resemble stock market 
speculators who "flip" stocks by buying and selling them quickly, with little regard for a com-
pany's welfare. See, e.g., Kibel, supra note 133, at 612. For these investors, community support 
or lack thereof may be a factor in the profit calculus, but not something to dwell upon. Id. ("In 
the pages of [the] Brownfield News [newsletter], one is not likely to find discussion of economic 
equity, public participation, or environmental racism. These issues simply fall outside the in-
vestment scope of the publication."). 
174. See :(Gbel, supra note 133, at 609. 
175. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1003. 
176. Kibel, supra note 133, at 612. 
177. See J.B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environmental Jus-
tice: Cooperation, then Competition, then Conflict 9 DUKE ENVr'L L. & POL'Y F. 161 
(1999)(hereinafter Ruhl, Co-Evolution). 
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have done little more than note common themes178 or assume a link 
without much analysis.179 
"Equity" and "environmental justice" overlap in significant 
ways. In a democratic society, protecting the environment for future 
generations cannot be done without attention to legitimate distribu-
tional concerns.180 However, as Professor Ruhl demonstrates ably, 
there are differences between the two.181 The former was originally 
grounded in the tension between developed and developing nations182 
and in the evolving concept of intergenerational equity.183 The latter 
began as a piercing response to inequities in siting of hazardous waste 
facilities and similar concerns.184 Both Professors Ruhl and Dernbach 
conclude that "equity" is broader than the set of concerns advanced 
by the American environmental justice movement.185 "It is quite pos-
sible," Ruhl says, "that the law of sustainable development will even-
tually catch up with and then subsume the law of environmental jus-
tice. "186 In this issue, he examines how that may occur.187 
·For now, I address environmental justice advocates' concerns 
about brownfields policies, recognizing that achieving "equity" will 
178. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 51, at 618-20. 
179. See, e.g., Robin Morris Collin & Robert Collin, Where Did All the Blue Skies Go? 
Sustainability and Equity: The New Paradigm, 9 J. ENVrL. L. & LmG. 399, 445 (1994) (arguing 
that environmental justice is an indispensible component in the quest for urban sustainability). 
For a contrary perspective, see Kent E. Portney, Environmental Justice and Sustainability: ls 
There a Critical Nexus in the Case of Waste Disposal or Treatment Facility Siting?, 21 
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 827, 827 ("[T]he pursuit of environmental justice may, at least conceptu-
ally, undermine goals of sustainability.") 
180. See Torres, supra nqte 51, at 618-19. 
181. See Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 177, at 182-85. 
182 See Dernbach, Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 16; Eisen, Toward a Sustain-
able Urbanism, supra note 41, at 3 (sustainable development can "address equity concerns, 
such as achieving a just distribution of resources between developed and developing nations."); 
SHABECOFF, supra note 47, at 198-199; Tarlock, supra note 35, at 52-53 (noting that 
"sustainable development has been' adopted ... in an effort to bridge the North-South or rich· 
poor environmental gap ... "). 
183. See, e.g., Torres, supra note 51, at 620. 
184. See generally Torres, Id. at 51 (discussing the history and evolution of the environ· 
mental justice movement). There is considerable literature on the environmental justice 
movement and its goals and objectives. See, e.g., Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, 
at 1002 n.540 and sources cited therein. 
185. See Dernbach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10510; Ruhl, Co-Evolution, note 177, at 
15. A recent book on the "ecology of place" states that "community sustainability," a move-
ment in its infancy, "may offer a useful and unifying framework ... in which the health of the 
larger community is what becomes most important." See BEA1LEY & MANNING, supra note 8, 
at 34-36. This political vision would transcend the concerns.of one individual or group. 
186. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290 n.52. 
187. See generally Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 177. 
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require even more attention. One policy path to this goal might be to 
apply current laws to brownfields programs. There is no well-defined 
body of "environmental justice law" per se, but rather a scattered set 
of pronouncements that reinterprets existing laws, such as Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act, to address environmental justice issues.188 As 
Professor Ruhl observes, it is still far too soon to predict the eventual 
shape of environmental justice law,189 and adopting its current legal 
pro:Xies would require us to deal with all the uncertainties about the 
effectiveness of laws not designed specifically to address environ-
mental justice concerns.190 We would be better off enumerating spe-
cific core principles, incorporating them in brownfields programs, and 
revisiting them if necessary. 
Perhaps the most important core principle is broad-based public 
participation in brownfields remediation efforts, which is both consis-
tent with Agenda 21191 and important for a VCP's success. Professor 
Wolf notes: "[t]here is ... strong sentiment that public participation 
is the public policy component that most efficiently addresses envi-
ronmental justice concerns" at brownfields sites.192 The National En-
vironmental Justice Advisory Council's report on environmental jus-
tice and brownfields policies calls for expanded public participation,193 
188. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290 n.50 {discussing the 
EPA's regulations and the lower court's decision in Chester v. Seif); see also Chester Residents 
Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 {3d Cir. 1997), judgment vacated as moot, 
Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 119 S.Ct. 22 {1998). For a forceful 
criticism of the EPA Title VI policy, see Henry Payne, Green Redlining: How Rules Against 
"Environmental Racism" Hurt Poor Minorities Most of All, REASON, Oct. 1998, at 26. 
189. See Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance, supra note 9, at 290. In 1998, the Supreme 
Court could have offered welcome clarification, but eventually did not do so. It accepted the 
case of Chester v. Seif, which would have explicitly tested the limits of Title VI in environ-
mental justice cases; however, the Court subsequently dismissed the case as moot. See Chester, 
supra Note 188, at 22. 
190. See, e.g., id. at 290 n.51 (questioning whether the disparate impact or discriminatory 
intent standard of Title VI will be applied in environmental justice cases). 
191. See Dembach, Agenda 21; supra note 38, at n.52 (citing paragraph 23.2 of Agenda 21) 
("One of the fundamental prerequisites for achievement of sustainable development is broad 
public participation in decision-making."). But see Kal Raustiala, Note, The "Participatory 
Revolution" in International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVIL. L. REV. 537, 566 (The 
"Rio Declaration states that '[E]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of 
all concerned citizens, at the relevant level."'). 
192. Wolf, supra note 3, at 27. 
193. National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, Waste and Facility Siting Subcom-
mittee, Environmental Justice, Urban Revitalization, and Brownfields: The Search for Authentic 
Signs of Hope (last modified Sept. 3, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/pdf/nejacpdf.htm>. 
The NEJAC is the EPA's "formal advisory committee to assist the agency in the furtherance of 
its environmental justice objectives," and "is composed of representatives from grass root envi-
ronmental justice organizations, industry, non-governmental organizations, state, local, and 
224 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:187 
as does the draft ASTM standard.194 Three years ago, I called upon 
states to provide "meaningful input by the surrounding community" 
in the two areas typically of most concern to them: "decisions on site 
uses and cleanup activities."195 At the time, public participation was 
not widely accepted because public outreach efforts could threaten to 
delay a project interminably, perhaps even causing a developer to 
abandon it. Many perceived it as incompatible with the streamlining 
spirit of VCPs.196 As noted earlier, many state brownfields statutes 
1 
reflected this attitude, providing few if any public input opportuni-
ties. 
However, there has been a sea change in opinion.- Proponents 
have now come to believe public participation is essential for projects 
to succeed. In a recent article, a team of policy analysts concludes, 
"Community relations can make or break a brownfields project."197 
Lessons From The Field demonstrates the importance of public par-
ticipation, stating that, 
In almost every case study analyzed, carefully orchestrated public 
outreach and involvement plans were implemented from the outset. 
Without this critical community buy-in, many pr?ject participants 
note, their efforts could easily have fallen apart.1 
There is still a lag between reality and law, however, in that most 
state statutes still require little more than nominal public participa-
tion, and most public outreach efforts are done through ad hoc 
groups or task forces convened for particular projects.199 Where de-
velopers undertake public outreach efforts without a framework to 
constrain their activities, one person's "carefully orchestrated" out-
reach can easily become another's "illegitimate process." 
tribal governments, and academia." See Torres, supra note 51, at 617. See also Wolf, supra note 
3,at 27 (discussing the NEJA C's activities). 
194. See Standards Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 5. 
195. See Eisen, Brownfie/ds of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1000 n.525 and sources cited 
therein. See also Kass et al., supra note 17, at 347 (identifying different opinions about future 
site uses and cleanup standards as two of "three recurring areas of tension" in brown.fields 
projects between developers and communities). 
196. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1003-04; Wolf, supra note 3, at 28. 
197. Kass et al., supra note 17, at 347. See also Standard Setter Weighs, supra note 14, at 5 
(citing comments of consultant Michael Taylor that "[a]lthough developers often have little 
patience for broad community discussion of cleanup and redevelopment plans, •.. large corpo-
rations ... trying to extricate themselves from environmental liability ... understand the need 
for community participation ... "). 
198. See PEPPER, supra note 92, at 18. 
199. See id. (citing the example of the redevelopment of a site in Minneapolis where a task 
force provided public support). 
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The obvious response to this problem would be to incorporate 
meaningful public participation requirements in state statutes. Flor-
ida's brownfields statute, adopted in 1997, is noteworthy for aiming 
to do just that.200 Under that statute, environmental justice advocates 
have opportunities for input in the public hearing supporting a local-
ity's designation of a "brownfield area" for redevelopment (when a 
hearing is necessary),201 and the deliberations of an "advisory commit-
tee" established to make recommendations about the cleanup of an 
individual site.202 
I have proposed "Community Working Groups" for brownfields 
redevelopment,203 so one might expect me to endorse Florida's advi-
sory committee concept. However, Florida's approach has significant 
shortcomings. There is no requirement that governmental officials 
respond to community members' concerns about future site uses and 
cleanup standards. The advisory committee has no role in approving 
redevelopment plans204 or setting cleanup standards.205 The latt~r is 
200. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 376.79(8) (1998) (defining "[e]nvironmental justice" as "the 
fair treatment of all people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the development, 
inlplementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies"); id. ch. 
376.78(7) (expressing legislative intent that "[e]nvironmental justice considerations should be 
inherent in meaningful public participation elements of a brownfields redevelopment pro-
gram."); id. ch. 376.80(4) (establishing an advisory committee process to, inter alia, "receiv[e] 
public comments ... on environmental justice"). 
In her Comment, Tara Burns Koch argues the Florida statute effectively responds to my 
environmental justice concerns and those of Professor Georgette Poindexter. Koch, supra note 
34, at 218. There is no question that the Florida statute is a "significant step in recognizing and 
alleviating these concerns," as Ms. Koch clainls. Id. at 219. However, as I discuss in the text, it 
lacks certain key features that would lead me to agree completely with her. 
201. The designation of a "brownfield area" is a prerequisite to the statutory process for 
redevelopment and a public hearing on this designation is necessary if "a local government 
proposes to designate a brownfield area that is outside community redevelopment areas, enter-
prise zones, empowerment zones, closed military bases, or designated brownfield pilot project 
areas, .... " FLA. STAT. ch. 376.80(2)(a) (1998). 
202. See FLA. STAT. ch. 376.80( 4) (1998). The relevant portion of the statute states: 
Local governments or persons responsible for rehabilitation and redevelopment of 
brownfield areas must establish an advisory committee for the purpose of inlproving 
public participation and receiving public comments on rehabilitation and redevelop-
ment of the brownfield area, future land use, local employment opportunities, com-
munity safety, and environmental justice. Such advisory committee should include 
residents within or adjacent to the brownfield area, businesses operating within the 
brownfield area, and others deemed appropriate. The advisory committee must re-
view and provide recommendations to the board of the local government with juris-
diction on the proposed site rehabilitation agreement provided in subsection (5). 
203. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1017-20. The CWG would "provide 
input on actions taken at all stages of the voluntary cleanup process .... " Id. at 1017. 
204. Ms. Koch recognizes this shortcoming, calling for legislative change to "ensur[e] the 
community not only has a voice but also a vote in approving a proposed redevelopment plan." 
Koch, supra note 33, at 219. 
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particularly unfortunate because Florida eschewed generic cleanup 
standards in favor of setting the cleanup standard anew at each site.206 
Because the local government establishes the committee's member-
ship, it could put politics before participation. There is no guarantee 
the committee's input will be respected nor is there a requirement to 
consider the committee's recommendations or modify the site 
cleanup agreement if the comments suggest inadequacies. The com-
mittee is reduced to employing whatever ability for political persua-
sion it has available. 
As I have noted, fu order for environmental justice concerns to 
be fully incorporated in the brownfields redevelopment process, the 
affected community must be a partner, not a mere sounding board.207 
While states such as Florida have made good starts in this direction, 
their efforts are insufficient. 
There are two indispensable elements for meaningful public par-
ticipation. First, rather than deferring to brownfields developers' 
judgments, states should enshrine broad-based frameworks that in-
volve community members as full participants in every stage of the 
redevelopment process. Paul Kibel has suggested one intriguing 
model that resembles my "Community Working Group" proposal: 
"Restoration Advisory Boards" ("RABs") designed to provide 
community input on environmental issues in the military's base clo-
sure process.208 Unlike ad hoc task forces or advisory committees, the 
RABs are directed by statute to involve community members 
throughout the process.209 
205. See FLA. STAT. ch. 376.81 (1998). 
206. See Koch, supra note 33, at 222. As Ms. Koch recognizes, this does obviate my con-
cern regarding the political legitimacy of setting generic cleanup standards on a statewide basis, 
at least in Florida. 
207. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 1000-20; Poindexter, supra note 
171, at 1 (advocating a "stakeholder theory" approach to brownfields redevelopment). See also 
Kibel, supra note 133, at 617; Mc Williams, supra note 104, at 773-77; Skelley, supra note 135, at 
392-93. But see Gauna, supra note 97, at 50 (calling for reinvention of public participation 
mechanisms to promote environmental justice). 
208. !Jee Kibel, supra note 133, at 617-18. See also Major Stuart W. Risch, The National 
Environmental Committee: A Proposal to Relieve Regulatory Gridlock at Federal Facility Super-
fund Sites, 151 MIL. L. REV. 1, 100 (1996) (calling a failed CERCLA bill of the 104th Congress 
from which I derived the CWG concept an attempt to "establish( ] CWGs, local panels that 
would replace entities like the Restoration Advisory Boards (RAB) previously used by the 
DOD."). · 
209. See 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d)-(f) (1998) (describing the establishment of RABs and their 
functions). A RAB must be consulted on a wide range of issues, including: 
(1) Identifying environmental restoration activities and projects at the installation 
or installations. 
(2) Monitoring progress on these activities and projects. · 
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Second, the scope of current public participation efforts often 
puts the cart before the horse. These efforts should be structured to 
define redevelopment plans for entire cities as well as for individual 
brownfields sites. Unfortunately, as I noted earlier, many brown-
fields projects do not come to fruition under the umbrella of a com-
munity-wide scheme for growth. 
The brownfields redevelopment process is beginning to resemble 
earlier high-profile urban redevelopment efforts such as urban re-
newal and enterprise zoning.210 At the outset, proponents claim to in-
volve stakeholders in community-based efforts to decide the fate of 
each city. Nevertheless, the process becomes politicized.211 Lessons 
From The Field, the recent report by the nonprofit Northeast Mid-
west Institute about 20 case studies of brownfields redevelopment, 
identifies "critical ingredients for success" that include the city be-
coming a "'brownfields broker,' essentially helping interested buyers 
acquire [sites]"; providing financing to make projects viable; and es-
tablishing private-public sector partnerships.212 The report suggests, 
without any trace of irony, that "partnerships between project par-
ticipants and politicians" are important.213 As one early commentator 
on brownfields policies feared, corporations and developers are 
making deals with local politicians that effectively shut out public in-
put.214 
(3) Collecting information regarding restoration priorities for the installation or in-
stallations. 
( 4) Addressing land use, level of restoration, acceptable risk, and waste manage-
ment and technology development issues related to environmental restoration at 
the installation or installations. 
(5) Developing environmental restoration strategies for the installation or installa-
tions. 
Id. at§ 2705(f). See also Major David A. Wallace et al, Contract Law Developments of 1997-
The Year In Review, 1998 ARMY LAW. 10, 84 (describing revised regulations regarding provi-
sion of technical assistance to RABs). 
210. See Kibel, supra note 133, at 608 (Environmental justice advocates' "[s]kepticism 
about brownfields reclamation was based on . . . the negative experiences of many communi-
ties with urban renewal policies ... aimed at improving housing and economic development in 
inner cities [that] failed to achieve their goals."). 
211. Professor Wolf describes how "politics as usual" has come to pervade the process of 
selecting U.S. cities for Empowerment Zones, which he terms a "sweepstakes." See \Volf, su-
pra note 3, at 29-30. 
212 Pepper, supra note 92, at 15-17. 
213. Id. at 17. 
214. See McWilliams, supra note 104, at 771. See also Kibel, supra note 133, at 612 
("[T]here is concern that the brownfields issue is being economically and politically hijacked by 
interests that have no connection with, or true concern about, the communities they claim to be 
helping."). 
228 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:187 
Sustainable development requires us to reject this ad hoc, politi-
cized approach to urban redevelopment. Lessons From The Field 
notes, "brownfield initiatives should dovetail with a community's 
'vision' for growth."215 The process of articulating that vision should 
feature public input. An example of a more inclusive sustainability 
planning process is that of Chattanooga, where "[t]he city has 
achieved economic prosperity, greater social equity, and a higher 
quality environment by using a broad-based citizen involvement 
process to set and achieve goals."216 However, while broad-based 
public participation processes are important, we must heed Professor 
Wolf's caution about relying on public outreach efforts as a 
"panacea." The other reforms discussed in this Article are important 
as well. 
Consider this example of Pfizer Inc.'s 1998 announcement that it would build a research 
facility in Connecticut: "Before announcing it would build a facility in New London, Pfizer 
worked out a wide-ranging deal with the state and local officials covering financial incentives, 
community development and liability." Pfizer provides return on cleanup investment, THE 
BROWNFIELDS LETI'ER, Nov. 1998, at 1. The state recruited Pfizer, extending it incentives to-
taling almost $75 million, including $9 million for complete remediation of the site under the 
state's brownfields program. Id. See also Tom Condon, Sweet Smell of Success Drifting Into 
New London, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept 1, 1998, at A3; Robert A. Hamilton, In the Re-
gion/Connecticut; Pfizer Reaches Across the Thames for More Space, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, 
§ 11 at 7 (explaining the Pfizer deal) .. 
It is hard to dispute the positive impact of a facility bringing 1,500-2,000 jobs to a city with 
a moribund economy. See Tom Condon, Football? No, This Is 'Folly' Ball, HARTFORD 
CoURANT, Dec. 15, 1998, at A3 (contrasting the Pfizer deal with the proposal to expend state 
funds to build a stadium in Hartford to lure a pro football team) ("I support the state's $65 mil-
lion investment in New London, because it will bring 2,000 high-paying Pfizer biotech jobs, 
great spinoff potential and a new state park . . . . The stadium isn't anywhere near as good a 
deal.") See also Tina Cassidy, Conn. OK's Patriots Stadium, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1998, at 
Al (describing the stadium deal). 
Because the Pfizer project was effectively a "done deal" before its announcement, how-
ever, there was little real opportunity to examine its environmental impacts in local fora. That 
precludes us from terming even a project as meritorious as Pfizer's "sustainable development." 
215. PEPPER, supra note 92, at 18. 
216. Dembach, Agenda 21, supra note 38, at 10508. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As Professor Ben Boer has noted, "[t]he question of sustainabil-
ity will continue to be high on the political agenda in coming years."217 
The only real remaining question of any significance is how to man-
age the discussion's end game. 
For now, the link between brownfields and sustainability must be 
more than something built on assumptions. Attaining the societal 
goal of sustainable development requires institutions at all levels of 
government to implement strategies to ensure that economic devel-
. opment, social goals, and environmental regulation go hand in hand. 
The failure of state VCPs and federal policies to reach this level is 
readily apparent when one evaluates. these laws and policies under 
the three core principles for implementing sustainability. 
The upcoming National Town Meeting provides an excellent op-
portunity to recognize a strong connection between brownfields poli-
cies and sustainable development by declaring a goal of making these 
core principles part of the foundation of every state VCP and federal 
brownfields program. To those who would respond that "sustainable 
development" is too vague or the specifics of implementing it in the 
brownfields arena elude definition or agreement, my response is sim-
ple: follow my reform proposals and those advocated by commenta-
tors Wolf, Buzbee, Abrams, Kibel, and Poindexter, and the rest may 
well take care of itself. 
217. Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development, supra note 1, at 358. 

